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ABSTRACT

CHALLENGING POLICIES THAT DO NOT PLAY FAIR:
A CREDENTIAL RELEVANCY FRAMEWORK USING
TRUST NEGOTIATION ONTOLOGIES

Travis Scott Leithead
Department of Computer Science
Master of Science

This thesis challenges the assumption that policies will “play fair” within trust negotiation. Policies that do not “play fair” contain requirements for authentication that
are misleading, irrelevant, and/or incorrect, based on the current transaction context. To detect these unfair policies, trust negotiation ontologies provide the context
to determine the relevancy of a given credential set for a particular negotiation.
We propose a credential relevancy framework for use in trust negotiation that
utilizes ontologies to process the set of all available credentials C and produce a
subset of credentials C 0 relevant to the context of a given negotiation. This credential
relevancy framework reveals the credentials inconsistent with the current negotiation
and detects potentially malicious policies that request these credentials. It provides
a general solution for detecting policies that do not “play fair,” such as those used

in credential phishing attacks, malformed policies, and malicious strategies.
This thesis motivates the need for a credential relevancy framework, outlines
considerations for designing and implementing it (including topics that require further research), and analyzes a prototype implementation. The credential relevancy
framework prototype, analyzed in this thesis, has the following two properties: first,
it incurs less than 10% extra execution time compared to a baseline trust negotiation prototype (e.g., TrustBuilder); second, credential relevance determination does
not compromise the desired goals of trust negotiation—transparent and automated
authentication in open systems. Current trust negotiation systems integrated with
a credential relevancy framework will be enabled to better defend against users that
do not always “play fair” by incorporating a credential relevancy framework.
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Chapter 1 — Introduction

The Internet has made interactions between people easier, faster and closer than
ever before. However, increased automation and information access often neglects
security, an integral aspect of interpersonal transactions. As transactions move into
the digital domain, security measures must be in place to give people the peace of
mind necessary to have confidence when interacting online.
Many security techniques are in place today (refer to Table 1.1). All of these
have some basis in human trust (a connection to an individual or group of people)
and a vehicle for conveying that trust. Most of the systems that implement these
techniques are closed —meaning that in order to participate, a centralized authority
requires registration. Closed systems are analogous to living in a gated community—
arrivals and departures are authenticated because the member is recognizable at the
gate. While closed systems are ideal for many applications, they do not scale very
effectively—especially to Internet-wide proportions—nor are they suitable for applications desiring to customize their services for users possessing specific credentials.
For such services, security in an open system is desirable.

Online security techniques
Basis for trust
What you know
What you have
Who you are

Vehicle of trust
shared secrets, passwords,
personal information
keys, digital certificates,
smart cards, tokens
biometrics (fingerprint, eye,
voice recognition),
credential attributes

Example systems
username/password
role-based access control,
Kerberos [21], Keynote [4]
biometric scanners

Table 1.1: Current security techniques are based on what you know, what you have,
and who you are.
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One relatively new approach to open system security attempts to emulate the
social method of establishing trust. It is based on observing that people who have
never met frequently invest a small amount of initial trust in the other by sharing
relevant information about themselves in an effort to foster a mutual increase in
trust and confidence. In conversation with a stranger, for example, people often
build a foundation of trust with non-essential conversation before addressing more
sensitive subjects. Some interactions require only a small amount of trust. For
instance, in an exchange with a supermarket cashier, simply swiping a credit card or
writing a check is sufficient to form a trusting relationship because the supermarket
trusts the credit card issuer or bank. In more expensive or sensitive exchanges,
the supermarket may want additional proof of identity or may impose strict check
policies requiring further information exchange.
The types of personal information mentioned often take the form of credentials.
Generally, a credential is a document containing assertions of attributes or properties
about a person and is endorsed by a third party. Common credentials include credit
cards, driver’s licenses, passports, auto insurance, diplomas, etc. When two people
trust a common third party, by extension they should also trust the assertions made
by that party.
Digital credentials are the online analogue of physical credentials and serve as
a building block for establishing trust in open systems. A trusted third party creates a digital credential by placing attributes about a subject into a document and
cryptographically signing that document in such a way that preserves its integrity
and authenticity [13]. Digital credentials have been implemented using X.509v31
[17] and signed XML [29] standards.
1

X.509 certificates did not support the addition of user-defined attributes until version 3.
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Figure 1.1: Simplified overview of a policy and credential exchange in a negotiation.
When building trust online using digital credentials, a naı̈ve method involves
disclosing all non-sensitive credentials at once in hopes of providing the required
credentials to the other party. In the supermarket example, this is equivalent to
removing the sensitive credentials and then giving the remaining contents of a wallet
to the cashier. Obviously, more discretion should be taken. Access control policies
are documents that allow both parties to indicate the specific credentials that should
be presented in an exchange [32]. Using policies, each participant may indicate the
credentials required to build a sufficient level of trust in order to access a resource
or complete a transaction.
With digital credentials and policies, two entities may engage in a negotiation for
a desired resource. For example, a negotiation might proceed as illustrated in Figure
1.1. The client requests access to a resource. The server responds with its policy. To
satisfy the requirements of the server’s policy, the client must prove that it possesses
the required attributes as certified in digital credentials. The client evaluates the
policy, selects the necessary credentials to release, and discloses them to the server,
whereupon the server trusts the client sufficiently to provide the requested resource.
The process of exchanging credentials and policies as previously described is
3
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known as trust negotiation. Various trust negotiation systems exist [2, 3, 5, 19, 24,
26, 34, 39], each with differing policy languages and credential syntax. Using trust
negotiation, entities in open systems build trust gradually until they have sufficient
confidence to perform online transactions.
Trust negotiation does not always involve an iterative exchange of messages as
shown in Figure 1.1. One recent approach to trust negotiation involves using hidden
credentials to perform an entire negotiation in a single round [6, 8, 15] without
the need to disclose credentials or policies explicitly. Section 4.2.3 illustrates an
example of trust negotiation using hidden credentials—otherwise, the remainder of
this thesis presents trust negotiation using the iterative exchange model due to its
understandability and simplicity.
1.1

Trust negotiation paradigms
Trust negotiation research explores the use of automated and transparent ne-

gotiation agents, which represent a user’s preferences. The goals of automation
and transparency allow trust negotiation agents to be seamlessly integrated into a
ubiquitous computing world.
Automated trust negotiation implies that an agent makes credential and policy
release decisions automatically and that the entire authentication process proceeds
without any manual input. To facilitate this, users obtain credentials and define
policies for their own protected resources. Policies may also be defined to protect
other sensitive policies and credentials. In addition, a user must select an appropriate negotiation strategy [43] that contains the logic for unlocking and releasing
policies and credentials according to the user’s preferences. Other considerations
for automated operation will not be covered in this thesis, including interoperable
strategies [24], adequate privacy protection [31, 33], credential and policy storage
4
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and discovery [32]. Overcoming the difficulties inherent in automated operation
remains an open research question.
The second goal of trust negotiation allows authentication to occur transparently
to users. Transparency suggests that the user is unaware that a trust negotiation
is occurring. Ideally, after requesting a protected resource, the user notices only a
minimal delay while the authentication protocol runs “behind the scenes.”
To meet these automation and transparency goals, current trust negotiation
systems rely exclusively upon a negotiation strategy and access control policies to
guide negotiations to a successful conclusion.
A negotiation strategy is similar to an automated bargaining strategy. Negotiation strategies evaluate policies and select the relevant credentials that satisfy
them. The negotiation strategy also determines how credentials will be released.
Two disparate strategies include the eager and parsimonious strategies [38]: the
eager strategy releases all non-sensitive credentials every round of negotiation; the
parsimonious strategy only releases a minimal set of credentials that satisfy access
control policy requirements. Further research has proven that safe and complete
negotiation strategies allow a negotiation to succeed if possible [31, 35].
Access control policies describe the requirements necessary for release of sensitive
information or resources. Many varieties of access control policies have been explored
in the literature [2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 19, 26, 34, 36]. Requirements for trust negotiation
policies are outlined by Seamons et al. [32]. Essentially, a policy asks for the digital
credentials containing specific attributes about a user. Trust negotiation halts if a
policy cannot be satisfied [35].
Negotiation strategy and policy language research make a significant assumption: that malicious entities will not tamper with or modify strategies and policies.
5
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However, for trust negotiation systems to reach their full potential—deployment in
a ubiquitous computing world—this assumption must be challenged.
According to Seamons et al. [31], current negotiation strategies assume that both
participants “bargain in good faith.” In other words, pre-packaged strategies will not
be tampered with or modified from their original form and trust negotiation agents
will adhere to certain ethical guidelines. They suggest certification by an appropriate
inspection service as a way to enforce bargaining in good faith. However, a certified
negotiation strategy is insufficient protection from malicious entities with complete
control of a trust negotiation agent.
Policies offer a more vulnerable avenue for attack by malicious entities. Negotiation agents currently assume that a policy authoritatively defines the credentials
relevant to completing a transaction. This assumption is valid if the other negotiating party can be trusted not to alter or author malicious policies. As will be shown
in the next section, malicious policies have a disastrous effect on trust negotiation.
1.2

Challenging the assumption
Seamons et al. [33] briefly mention the problems that could occur when policies

received from a negotiating partner are assumed to be relevant:
During trust negotiation, one [or both] of the parties may request
credentials that are not absolutely necessary or relevant to the trust requirements of the transaction, even though that party may be entitled to
see them. A policy could require the disclosure of an inordinate amount
of information during a trust negotiation, beyond what is truly needed to
protect its resource. An unscrupulous party could use seemingly legitimate credential requests to gather extraneous information, thus violating
the privacy of the other party.
6
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The authors conclude that a secure channel is necessary to prevent a malicious eavesdropper from modifying policies in transit, and that digital signatures are necessary
to ensure policy integrity on disk. However, these solutions overlook a critical fact;
a negotiator may purposefully author a malicious policy and digitally sign it.
The rest of this chapter examines the problems caused by malicious strategies and
policies in greater depth. These include the privacy violations mentioned previously
by Seamons et al. (i.e., the collection of unnecessary or irrelevant information about
a user), as well as the devious collection of sensitive information (i.e., credential
phishing), and the malicious tampering of negotiation strategies, potentially leading
to denial of service. Each problem is illustrated by example within a scenario that
concretely illustrates the potential risks of policies that do not “play fair.”
1.2.1

Irrelevant credentials scenario

Some policies enable the broadest set of possible satisfying credentials to grant
access to a resource. However, all of the credentials requested may not be relevant
to the specific negotiation. For example, when renewing a driver’s license from
the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), various forms of acceptable personal
identification may be collected. Table 1.2 contains a set of attributes required by a
fictional DMV policy—all of which the DMV is authorized to collect2 .
In this scenario, Pat sends a request to the online DMV requesting a driver license
renewal. The DMV server replies to Pat’s request by starting a trust negotiation and
returning a policy containing requirements similar to those listed in Table 1.2. Pat’s
trust negotiation agent evaluates the policy and returns the relevant credentials.
Pat is disabled and possesses a permit to carry a concealed weapon—credentials
that the trust negotiation agent discloses as proof of identity in order to satisfy the
2

All attributes listed in Table 1.2 were collected from actual state or county DMV licensing
requirements (see http://www.onlinedmv.com).
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Fictional DMV Policy
Please provide two of the following identity proofs
Social Security Card
State ID
Insurance
US Birth Certificate
Employee ID
CDL Certificate
Vehicle Title
Vision Exam
Vehicle Registration
I/M Test Results
Disabled Status
Pilot’s License
Safety Test Results
Immigration Certificate
Passport
Adoption Certificate
Certified Name Change
GED or equivalent
Certified Marriage License Canadian Birth Certificate ID Card issued by the DoD
Certificate of Naturaliza- Permanent/Resident Alien Permit to carry a contion
Status
cealed weapon or firearm
Certificate of completion of
drivers training course

Table 1.2: Credentials potentially collected by the DMV for a driver license renewal.
policy. The driver license renewal negotiation policy requires only minimal (two)
proofs of identity and any two proofs will do. While the DMV server is authorized
to accept all these forms of proof, Pat may not want knowledge of the disabled
status and concealed weapons permit credentials unnecessarily proliferated on the
Internet, especially when other more common credentials will satisfy the policy. In
this case, the decision of which credentials to release was arbitrary.
Due to the complexity and expressiveness of policy languages [2, 14, 24, 26, 36],
it is easy to imagine that policies can be written in error. Because most policy languages contain logical constructs (e.g., conjunctions and disjunctions) for grouping
credentials, sets of required credentials can erroneously be assigned as optional and
vice-versa. The DMV policy expressed previously could easily have contained an
error specifying that Pat must release all of the requested credentials rather than
any two of them. One simple error could lead to irrelevant credential requests.
Because most policy creation and modification is performed manually, policies are
highly error-prone.
Whether the DMV policy was written in error or not, Pat’s trust negotiation
8
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agent was unable to recognize that it was releasing extraneous or irrelevant credentials based only on the policy received. If their detection were possible, Pat might
have prevented, altered, or justified their automatic release and provided valuable
feedback to the DMV server, allowing them to correct their policy.
Pat’s privacy concerns are justified because disclosed information is often harvested to analyze buying patterns, collect demographic information, buy or sell
personal information, etc. This scenario considers the release of irrelevant information to a server that is justified in obtaining it. The next scenario presents a more
potentially damaging irrelevant policy.
1.2.2

Credential phishing scenario

If policies can be written to petition any attribute, then policies in the hands
of malicious entities can be disastrous. One strategy used by a malicious entity is
to set up a server that looks and feels the same as a legitimate web server. This
technique, known as a phishing attack 3 , extends to trust negotiation where the user
is much more vulnerable.
Lynn requests medical records from a HIPAA-compliant4 hospital website. Unfortunately, Lynn has actually requested information from an impersonating phishing website. The malicious website hosts a trust negotiation phishing service designed to steal credit card information. After Lynn requests the medical records,
the malicious trust negotiation agent returns a carefully-crafted policy requesting
3

http://www.antiphishing.org reports that “Phishing attacks use ‘spoofed’ e-mails and
fraudulent websites designed to fool recipient into divulging personal financial data such as credit
card numbers, account usernames and passwords, social security numbers, etc. By hijacking the
trusted brands of well-known banks, online retailers and credit card companies, phishers are able
to convince up to 5% of recipients to respond to them.” Policies designed for phishing attacks are
a natural extension to current phishing schemes.
4
HIPAA law (2004) states that costs for copies of personal medical information should only
cover the cost of materials, postage, and prepared summary forms, and that entities “may not
charge any fees for retrieving or handling the information, or for processing the request for copies”
(see http://www.hipaadvisory.com/action/legalqa/law/Legal47.htm).
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credit card information. Lynn’s automated trust negotiation strategy determines
that a VISA and Mastercard credential will satisfy the malicious policy. Depending
on Lynn’s privacy preferences, these credentials may be considered sensitive. If not,
they are disclosed to the fraudulent hospital website, resulting in the automated
theft of Lynn’s credit cards. Alternately, Lynn replies to the credit card-phishing
policy with another policy protecting the credit card credentials. The phishing agent
must be able to satisfy Lynn’s policy in order to successfully steal the credit cards.
Phishing attacks will be successful to the extent that the attacker can impersonate
the real server and its credentials.
Because of automation and transparency, users like Lynn may unknowingly fall
victim to malicious policies because of their own security software. If Lynn were able
to detect that the malicious policy was requesting credit card information during an
apparent medical records request, the attack might have been subverted. Li et al.
[24] present a similar scenario in which a malicious server is able to detect that a
user possesses arbitrarily specific sensitive credentials. However, the attacker cannot
infer the exact content of those credentials without their disclosure.
Credential phishing is a potentially serious problem for automated trust negotiation, because policies are trusted and trust negotiation agents are designed to
disclose whatever credentials are petitioned or the policies that guard their release.
Current trust negotiation systems have no mechanism for detecting that a policy’s
required credentials are not relevant to the context of the original request.
Malicious policies are not limited to usurping sensitive information like credit
cards. They may be used in a variety of ways to attack the very core of the trust
negotiation protocol itself. For example, extremely large and complicated policies
can be designed to cause a denial of service by requiring the compliance checker to
10
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spend extra computational cycles attempting to satisfy a policy. The final scenario
presents another possible attack based on malicious policies.
1.2.3

Malicious strategy scenario

Recently, Ryutov et al. [30] mentioned many possible avenues for attacking
trust negotiation. One such method is to cause a denial of service attack by forcing
a negotiation to continue without progressing toward a successful conclusion. The
final scenario presents a denial of service attack caused by a malicious negotiation
strategy.
Borders bookstore has set up a trust negotiation-enabled web server that offers
discounted books to students of accredited universities. Terry, a disgruntled exemployee decides to take revenge on the company and launch a denial of service
attack on the discount service. Terry’s trust negotiation strategy is carefully altered
so that it randomly generates policies that do not lead to a successful negotiation. To
begin the attack, Terry generates a request for a student discount. When the server
responds with a policy stating that the client must be a student, Terry’s negotiation
strategy ignores the policy and replies with a random policy. A random policy
is returned each time the server responds with a policy. Terry then begins many
simultaneous requests for the discount, continuing until Border’s trust negotiation
server is rendered useless because legitimate requests cannot get through.
The Borders trust negotiation server was vulnerable to this type of denial of
service because Terry modified a trust negotiation strategy, and the server could not
detect the irrelevant policies. Ryutov et al. also discuss an approach for responding
to denial of service attacks by adapting policies according to a server suspicion
level and adjusting various server time-outs. Alternatively, this thesis considers a
context-based approach for detection of policy irrelevant information requests.
11
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1.3

Solution Overview
These three scenarios depict a range of negative consequences provoked by poli-

cies and negotiation strategies that do not “play fair.” To mitigate the potential
risk to users of trust negotiation and to make trust negotiation a robust authentication protocol for open systems, previous assumptions that policies and negotiation
strategies will “play fair” must be challenged.
This thesis leverages a new source of context to fortify trust negotiation systems.
As detailed in Chapter 2, context is essential when negotiating trust—however, current contexts are insufficient to provide the capacity to establish the relevancy of an
unfamiliar policy. Other authentication systems [9, 40] similarly incorporate external contexts to buoy their information sources allowing a smarter authentication to
occur. However, our solution is unique in that it is the first to use context to infer
the relevance of access control policies themselves and to assert their relevance to
the negotiation.
The context used to protect trust negotiation policies will be expressed using
ontologies as outlined in Chapter 3. Ontologies possess many features that make
them ideal for context sharing, reuse, and distribution to agents in an open system.
Ontologies containing negotiation context are called trust negotiation ontologies.
Chapter 4 introduces the credential relevancy framework; one solution that uses
trust negotiation ontologies to thwart attacks by malicious policies and negotiation
strategies. The credential relevancy framework is designed as an extension to current
trust negotiation systems lacking sufficient context to protect themselves. Chapters
5 and 6 explore the framework’s two main components, the ontology context channel
and decision module.
This thesis also contains a prototype implementation of the credential relevancy
12
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framework. The implementation is intended to validate the feasibility of the framework and to ensure that the overhead incurred by the framework is negligible (i.e.,
less than 10% of the total computational overhead). Chapter 7 presents the implementation of the credential relevancy framework, which is subsequently analyzed in
Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter 9 presents the conclusions drawn from this work and
discusses future work.
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Chapter 2 — Relevancy Determination Obstacles

There are many obstacles that must be considered when designing a credential
relevancy framework for trust negotiation. Four primary obstacles are: context, user
discretion, context source, and universal agreement. Understanding these obstacles
provides a foundation for designing a credential relevancy framework.
2.1

Context
As described in Chapter 1, policies are the sole context for deriving appropriate

satisfying credentials considered by current trust negotiation systems. This section
outlines other currently available contexts and identifies a new context that makes
credential relevance detection possible.
2.1.1

Available contexts

Trust negotiation systems use many existing contexts as bases for determining
relevancy. Beyond the contexts explicitly utilized in credential verification (issuer,
subject, attributes, expiration, signature, and type1 ), other existing contexts are
available but often overlooked. Four available contexts include: time, frequency,
location, and session-based information.
Time is a beneficial context for geographically-based trust negotiations. For
example, a trust negotiation server hosting national resources might use time to determine connection relevancy. Connections occurring during the middle of the night
(relative to the client’s time zone) might be ignored or flagged as suspicious. Time
becomes less useful as geography becomes less relevant. Very localized systems, such
as the Aware Home, have successfully integrated a useful time context [9].
1

Generally, credential types are analogous to credential identifiers such as credit card, driver
license, etc. IBM-based Trust Establishment (TE), reserves a specific OID type value within an
X.509v3 credential allowing TE credentials to be mapped to profiles describing their attributes.
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Frequency and location are two good contexts for determining suspicious behavior. Frequency (i.e., how often a credential is submitted or a negotiation occurs) and
the physical location or IP address of a connection may indicate denial of service
attacks on trust negotiation systems. Ryutov et al. [30] recently leveraged these
contexts in their adaptive trust negotiation and access control (ATNAC) framework.
Wullems et al. [40] grant or deny access to protected resources after validating a
user’s location context via GPS locators and iButtons.
Session-based context maintains the current state of a trust negotiation and also
provides limited relevance determination. Prominent session-based context includes:
negotiation history, policies and credentials received, trust requirements met, and
round count. TrustBuilder, a trust negotiation prototype, uses session-based context
to conclude that a negotiation has failed when no new policies or credentials are
disclosed and all possible negotiation paths have been exhausted [42].
Other than the four previously discussed, useful contexts such as credential sensitivity, individual policy/credential frequency, credential submission count, credential
and policy context groups (groups of related credentials), and credential attribute
granularity, may contribute additional robustness and intelligence to future trust
negotiation agents. The use of these contexts is not explored in this thesis.
2.1.2

Current contexts are too narrow

Unfortunately, none of the preceding contexts provides sufficient information
to detect irrelevant credential solicitations or malformed policies because they do
not express any relevant information about the nature of the negotiation. How
can a trust negotiation agent deduce that a policy is irrelevant with respect to the
negotiation when a negotiation context is unavailable? Such a negotiation context
is required before a credential relevancy framework can be designed.
16
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Figure 2.1: A sample trust negotiation annotated with three areas enclosing currently understood relevant contexts, labeled A, B, and C. An additional negotiation
context is necessary to provide relevancy determination for policies (label D).
Trust agents depend on context information to make relevancy decisions critical
to negotiation progress. Figure 2.1 graphically depicts three uses2 of existing context
that define how the term relevant is currently understood in trust negotiation literature [32, 39]. The dashed areas in the sample negotiation show the three instances of
current relevancy determination during a trust negotiation. A dotted line surrounds
the fourth area depicting a necessary, but missing, context for determining policy
relevance.
The first area (Figure 2.1-A), encompasses all of the context that associates
the requested resource R with its protecting policy P . This context is unique and
2

Omitted from the figure is a fourth use of relevant context that relates to credential chain
verification—the use of one credential’s context to assert the relevancy of the next, and so on.
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totally self-contained on the server—no external context is necessary to relate R
to P because both are owned and maintained by the server. However, when P is
released, all implicit context 3 associated with it is lost.
Area 2.1-B represents all the context used by the client to discover the credentials
C necessary to satisfy P . Contexts from Section 2.1.1 can be applied in this area
to improve client confidence or protect against denial of service, but these existing
contexts fail to establish relevancy between P and the current negotiation context
(area 2.1-D). Area 2.1-B is represented on the side of the client in the figure, but
also applies to the server when a counter-policy is sent from the client.
Finally, area 2.1-C depicts the context that relate received credentials C to policy
P . For the server, the policy is trusted but not the credentials, which is the inverse
of area 2.1-B on the client. Contexts currently applied in area 2.1-C are necessary for
trust negotiation because credentials are implicitly irrelevant until proven relevant4 .
Area 2.1-C occurs on both the client and server, depending on the current round of
negotiation.
A new area of context is necessary to mitigate the problems of trusting potentially malicious policies received in area 2.1-B. Area 2.1-D must include context
that relates a policy P or its required credentials C to a negotiation class 5 and is
understood by each negotiating agent. Provided with such a context, policy P can
be declared relevant, allowing credentials C to be selected with confidence.
Developing a context that associates negotiation classes with credential require3

Implicit context refers to the server’s intended usage, assumptions, and trust in the policy,
while explicit context entails the predicates, rules, and trust requirements specified directly in the
policy.
4
Relevancy proof for credentials include: credential ownership verification, certificate integrity checking (signature checking), certificate revocation checking, valid credential proof chain—
including a trusted root authority, attribute verification, and policy compliance.
5
A negotiation class is a convenient shorthand for expressing the purpose, goal, or reason for a
trust negotiation.
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ments (policies) is a difficult task—primarily because negotiation types are linked
to human perceptions, which are not easily expressible. Requiring users to specify
policy relevance according to their perceived negotiation class may seem plausible,
but leads to other obstacles as outlined in the next section. As will be shown, a
more concrete context that formalizes negotiation classes is necessary.
2.2

User discretion
An easy solution that evades quantifying negotiation classes invokes user dis-

cretion concerning the relevancy of petitioned credentials. The user is interrupted
and verifies that the credentials selected for release are relevant to the negotiation,
as perceived by the user. While apparently ideal, this solution is impractical for
four reasons: first, common users are poor judges of credential or policy relevance;
second, user interruptions become prohibitive as trust negotiations get more complex; third, user interruptions violate the principals of automation and transparency;
fourth, this solution is unilateral—it fails for servers.
2.2.1

Users uncertain of relevance

Requiring common users to make critical relevancy decisions regarding policy
requirements or credential disclosures is impractical. Policy languages are designed
for automated machine processing and are expressed in many differing syntaxes
and semantics. Figures 2.2-A, 2.2-B, 2.2-C, and 2.2-D, show four current policy
languages, TPL [14], PeerTrust [26], Ponder, and Rei [36], respectively. As yet, no
standard trust negotiation policy language exists, and none of the current languages
are easy for people to understand nor provide a translation to natural language.
2.2.2

User discretion prohibitive in complex negotiations

In simple negotiations (involving few policies and credentials), users are able
to quickly verify the relevance of objects received or released by their trust agent.
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Figure 2.2: Four examples of current trust negotiation policy languages.
However, actual trust negotiations may become very large, consisting of many negotiation rounds, policies, and credentials. For example, actual policies6 are exponentially more complicated, involving thousands of predicates. Such policies necessitate
hundreds of credential disclosures. Requiring user intervention to declare policy or
credential relevance in a timely and efficient manner becomes prohibitive as policy
complexity and credential numbers increase.
2.2.3

A violation of automation and transparency principles

Requiring user permission for credential release violates the principles of automation and transparency described in Section 1.1—trust negotiation should occur
automatically and not be intrusive to the user. A relevancy detection framework that
6

The Cassandra trust negotiation system [2] uses an Electronic Health Record policy, designed for the UK’s National Health Service, for managing access to heath records (see
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/TechReports/UCAM-CL-TR-628.pdf).
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relies completely on user intervention directly opposes these principles. However, a
completely automated and transparent framework risks making improper decisions
in sensitive, critical, or ambiguous situations. Prudence suggests interrupting the
user in these situations, while otherwise respecting the principles of automation and
transparency. This thesis presents a framework permitting user interruption only
in cases of irrelevancy. Ongoing research efforts will determine the ideal balance
between trust negotiation principles and user interruption.
2.2.4

A uniquely client-side approach

Finally, a relevancy detection framework driven by user intervention is a uniquely
client-side approach—trust negotiation servers must adhere to the principles of automation and transparency more strictly because users cannot be present to oversee
server negotiations.
2.3

Negotiation context location
Requiring user discretion to evade formally defining trust negotiation classes

is impractical in all but the simplest cases, therefore a formal context containing
negotiation classes must be created and accessible to both client and server. Figure
2.3 illustrates four possible configurations for the location of a negotiation context—
on the client, on the server, on both the client and server, and on a third party. Table
2.1 describes the pros and cons of these four configurations.
Locating relevancy source information on either the client or server alone is an
impractical solution primarily because one agent must rely wholly upon the other for
negotiation context. Such a configuration leads to problems of trust in the received
context—the same problems that already exist with policies. The most plausible
solutions provide a source of negotiation context either on both the client and server
or on a third party.
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Pros

Cons
Negotiation context on the client (see Figure 2.3-A)
Client stores only pertinent negotiation Requires additional user configuration.
classes—no need to scale.
Fully controlled and customizable to client Information interoperability problems
preferences.
with servers that may request client
relevancy information.
Client need not trust server context.
Client configuration and customized preferences may be error-prone.
A server without relevancy context cannot
protect itself from malicious clients.
Negotiation context on the server (see Figure 2.3-B)
Client needs no extra configuration—all Client cannot trust server negotiation conmanagement is handled on the server.
text because both the policy and context
belong to the untrusted server.
Server need not trust the client.
Server must determine one or more standard relevancy preferences for all clients.
Client cannot leverage predisposed negotiation (see Section 4.2.2) or other trust
negotiation acceleration algorithms based
on negotiation context.
Negotiation context on both client and server (see Figure 2.3-C)
Client and server can customize their pref- Possible exchange of negotiation class
erences independently.
preferences between servers or clients is
freeform—leading to parsing or translation failures.
Client and server are not co-dependent for Increase in percentage of relevancy detersources of negotiation context.
mination false positives due to misconfigured server or client preferences.
Negotiation context need not be ex- Proliferation of errors and inconsistencies
changed or standardized.
between negotiation class preferences.
Negotiation context on a third party (see Figure 2.3-D)
Third party certifies the correctness of ne- Client and server must trust the third
gotiation context.
party.
Third party mediates between client and
server, ensuring consistency.
Standardizes negotiation context syntax
and semantics.

Table 2.1: The pros and cons of four configurations for negotiation context source.
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Figure 2.3: Four configurations illustrating the location of negotiation context relative to a client, server, and optional third party. Negotiation context may be only
on the client (A), only on the server (B), on both client and server (C), or on a third
party (D).

Ad-hoc trust exchange systems, known informally as a web of trust [20, 41], could
provide an adequate solution to the problems of locating relevancy context on both
clients and servers. Web of trust systems use majority vote to sway the consensus of
what is considered trustworthy by exchanging ad-hoc trust metrics. These systems
could easily be modified to exchange negotiation context in some form of relevancy
metric associated with specific negotiation classes. Because web of trust systems
leverage human perceptions of trust, they are well suited to convey negotiation class
preferences. However, the quantization, summarization, and expression of relevancy
preferences as relevancy metrics remains open to specification.
The most significant obstacle to hosting negotiation context on a third party
is that of trusting the third party. One acceptable solution is for the third party
to digitally sign the context. Thus, negotiation contexts become nearly analogous
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to digital credentials and principles of trust for digital credentials can naturally be
extended to signed context.
This thesis explores the possibility of hosting negotiation context on a third
party, rather than exchanging and retrieving context from a web of trust.
2.4

Universal agreement
Standardized negotiation classes, certified to be syntactically correct and digi-

tally signed to be trustworthy, are possible when the context source is provided by
third parties. In addition, these parties are responsible for defining the semantic
meaning of negotiation classes. Unfortunately, the inevitable diversity of available
third parities will result in heterogeneous semantic meaning. While a universal
agreement of semantic meaning is desirable, it is also impractical.
Hypothetically, universal agreement involves one or more unified third parties
that provide the only source for semantic meaning, thus defining all possible negotiation classes. One authoritative source is impractical considering the diversity of
conceivable trust negotiations. Furthermore, one source for relevancy is also a single
point of failure and attack.
Realistically, many diverse third parties will offer potentially competing negotiation contexts. Third parties may specialize within a certain domain of negotiation
classes, providing specific solutions to specific users. From diverse third parties,
clients and servers may select those that best suit their needs.
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This chapter introduces ontologies and describes the features that make them ideal
for structuring negotiation contexts.
3.1

Understanding ontologies
The term ontology has roots in the discipline of philosophy and means the study

of being or existence 1 . In computer science, the word also describes the terms and
relationships that exist within a given knowledge domain. Ontologies are conceptually a formal structure for specifying the vocabulary of possible language, grammar
rules, and relationships within a particular domain of interest.
Ontologies are composed of relationships between objects, often in a hierarchal
structure. Figure 3.1 illustrates two different valid ontology examples for a book,
using both tree and graphical notation2 . In Figure 3.1-A, the objects represent different types of books, as shown by the is a relationships between them, while Figure
3.1-B categorizes a book by its different attributes using the has a relationship. In
general, an ontology is not limited to one type of relationship—the book ontology
of Figure 3.1 might also include other relationships such as cardinality≥2, disjointWith, sameAuthorAs, etc. The figure illustrates only two of an infinite variety of
possible ontology designs; differing designs or classifications are known as dimensions. In principle, the number of distinct classifications for an object are unlimited
because the number of possible dimensions along which to categorize it cannot be
exhaustively specified [7].
1

A quick overview of ontologies may be found in the article “Ontology (computer science)” available on the Wikipedia (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology (computer science)).
2
The graphical notation for representing ontologies is borrowed from Horridge [16], and is similar
to Venn diagrams.
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Figure 3.1: Two alternative ontology dimensions for describing a book. Each ontology is represented in both a tree and Venn-like diagram (see Horridge et al. [16]).
Circles represent classes, arcs represent properties, and diamonds represent arbitrary instances. (A) describes a book using is a properties and (B) classifies a book
by its component parts using the has a property.
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Objects used in ontologies are formally called classes. A class is a set or grouping
of similar items that share class relationships, attributes and restrictions. In Figure
3.1, classes are represented by the circles labelled Book, FictionBook, Fantasy, etc.
The classes described in an ontology define the extent of the vocabulary used in
a specific knowledge domain [37]. While no fixed rules exist for ontology design,
classes are usually organized into is a relationships that relate specific classes to
more general classes as the class hierarchy is traversed. Once the fundamental is a
relationships are defined, more complex relations may be established.
The items contained in classes are known as instances. Instances are often omitted from the actual ontology specification and are included instead in databases.
Instances are classified based on the properties they contain. For example, the
instance Star Wars, would be included in the class Book because it is a book,
FictionBook because it is fictional, and the ScienceFiction and Fantasy subclasses
because it could belong to both.
Relationships between classes, formally known as properties or slots, act as rules
for describing complex and dynamic associations between classes. Besides basic is
a properties, two additional common properties include restrictions and cardinality
constraints. Restriction properties limit the instances included in a class to the
properties possessed by the instance, and cardinality constraints specify the number
of instances that can be included. For example, the class MultipleAuthors described
in a book ontology might include a restriction of ∃ hasAuthor MultipleAuthors 3 and
a cardinality constraint of ≥2 that together limit the valid set of instances in that
class to those that have an author property with two or more authors listed.
3

This restriction is read: “at least one Author that is an instance from the class MultipleAuthors,” meaning that if an instance has at least one author attribute whose value is an instance
belonging to the class MultipleAuthors, then that instance belongs to the restriction.
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Ontology research is divided into two veins, one theoretical and the other practical. Theoretical ontology research is concerned with the logical and systematic
organization of general concepts in the world. Ontologies of this nature, designed
for maximum reuse and ubiquity, are known as foundation or upper ontologies. Several examples of current foundation ontologies include CYC4 , GUM5 , WordNet6 ,
SUMO7 , and J. F. Sowa’s Knowledge Representation 8 . Upper ontology research
continues but is unlikely to yield a practical solution because the level of detail
necessary for real world tasks are outside its scope [7].
The key to practical ontology research are ontologies tailored to a specific problem domain, rather than attempts to describe all possible domains. Domain ontologies refer to ontologies localized to a certain problem domain. Domain ontologies
prohibit large scale information sharing and reuse, but make ontology design practical for applications. Ontology design tools like Protégé [12, 16, 28] facilitate rapid,
accurate domain ontology creation and management.
The proliferation of domain ontologies necessitated the creation and standard-

4

Derived from the word encyclopedia, CYC is a comprehensive ontology and database for
enabling AI applications to perform human-like reasoning. Began in 1984 by Doug Lenat,
CYC is used in many applications and has spawned an open-source derivative OpenCYC (see
http://www.cyc.com).
5
The generalized upper model is an ontology targeted at expressing information in natural language (see http://www.fb10.uni-bremen.de/anglistik/langpro/webspace/jb/gum/index.htm).
6
WordNet, developed at the cognitive science laboratory at Princeton, is an upper ontology
representing natural language (see http://wordnet.princeton.edu).
7
The suggested upper merged ontology is part of the IEEE Standard Upper Ontology
Working Group and targets meta, generic, abstract, or philosophical concepts [27] (see
http://ontology.teknowledge.com).
8
An ontology based on the book Knowledge Representation by J. F. Sowa with influence from
philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead, pioneers in symbolic logic (see
http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/).
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ization of ontology languages such as DAML+OIL9 and more recently OWL10 [37]
that formally describe the syntax used to specify ontologies. Formal specification allows ontologies to be machine understandable and thus processed by logic reasoners
like Racer 11 , when the expressiveness12 of the ontology language supports it. Logic
reasoners understand ontology rules (specified by properties), can infer new classes
not explicitly specified, and verify ontology consistency. Formal specification and
logic reasoners make ontologies very useful for automated systems and ideal for use
on the semantic web [1, 25].
Additionally, ontologies facilitate knowledge sharing. Through formal specification, the structure and rules for processing internal information is available for
automated systems to share. For instance, a business can simplify and automate
its sharing of public database information by sharing the ontology that allows other
businesses to automatically interpret and extract their information.
The features of ontologies previously discussed are summarized in Table 3.1.
These features make ontologies ideal for use in trust negotiation as outlined in the
next section.
3.2

Using ontologies in trust negotiation
The synthesis of ontology research and trust negotiation is a new research area.

Resultant research found that ontologies allow convenient expression of policies as
9

The DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML), initiated by US government research groups,
was developed for realizing the vision of the semantic web. Later, the independently developed
Ontology Inference Layer (OIL) specification by European researchers was combined into one
standard language.
10
Web Ontology Language (OWL), the W3C’s evolved version of DAML+OIL, contains additional language features that were not available in the old specification. OWL became an official
W3C recommendation in 2004.
11
The Racer project (see http://www.sts.tu-harburg.de/~r.f.moeller/racer/).
12
OWL-DL and OWL-Lite are two sublanguages of OWL that support automated reasoning
because their expressiveness is limited to a decidable first order logic (algorithms that will terminate
in finite time). OWL-Full provides the most expressive power at the expense of decidability [37].
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Ontology Features
Natural hierarchal structure
Unique class definitions
Definition of arbitrary properties
Currently evolving research area
Fit for knowledge sharing and reuse
Standardized formal language
Property classification inference
Consistency verification
Table 3.1: Summary of ontology features.

demonstrated by the KaOS trust management system [36]. Policies expressed using
ontologies enable constraint representation across diverse enforcement mechanisms
[37]. These ontologies uniquely define the terms necessary for policy specification
(in classes), the rules for policy satisfaction (properties), and are described in an
application-neutral format. Policies described using ontologies also benefit from
built-in consistency through the use of a logic reasoner that verifies an individual
policy or the knowledge represented by a collection of policies as a whole.
Leithead et al. [23] show how policies can be used in conjunction with ontologies
to provide additional ease of management, structure, and privacy. They describe
ontologies containing hierarchies of digital credential attributes using is a properties.
Policies protect privacy during early stages of trust negotiation by requesting only
the most general attribute from an ontology class13 . After more trust is established,
policy requests for more specific credential attributes are obtained by locating a
more specific ontology class.
Leithead et al. [23] laid the groundwork for this thesis by introducing negotiation
classes (as referenced in Chapter 2) in domain-specific ontologies. These ontologies
13

Leithead et al. are ambiguous when describing ontology structure. The representation of
digital credential attributes as ontology classes or instances is a trivial implementation issue.
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contain classes that provide hierarchical negotiation context and the properties that
link them to digital credential attributes. In this thesis, ontologies containing these
negotiation classes are referred to as trust negotiation ontologies. Chapter 5 describes
the structure and use of trust negotiation ontologies.
Authorized third party providers that describe typical trust negotiation ontologies are realistic and feasible. Businesses today leverage third party guidelines and
certifications to bolster trust by demonstrating that they adhere to general or typical operational procedures. For example, banks follow guidelines set forth by the
FDIC14 , employment agencies claim equal opportunity employer 15 , web sites follow
privacy and security guidelines prescribed by TRUSTe 16 , etc. Even big businesses
strive to certify to minimum quality standards such as iso900117 and other certifications. Such agencies exist to augment user trust in the business’ credibility. These
or similar agencies will provide and maintain the trust negotiation ontologies that
strengthen user trust in online negotiations by protecting them from irrelevant or
malicious policies.
The use of ontologies in trust negotiation is an exciting new research area. Few
trust negotiation systems currently utilize the benefits of ontologies. Future trust
negotiation agents can harness the benefits of ontologies for a higher degree of automation and negotiation-specific knowledge acquisition (e.g., understanding diverse
policy and credential languages in an open system).

14

The FDIC regulates and examines banks, providing required examinations, laws, reports,
training, etc (see http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/index.html).
15
The US equal employment opportunity commission regulates cases of discriminations and
provides various laws and guidelines for employers (see http://www.eeoc.gov).
16
TRUSTe provides security and privacy guidelines for online business (see
http://www.truste.org).
17
The organizational structure, processes, and procedures necessary to ensure the
quality of the overall intentions and direction of an organization [paraphrased] (see
http://www.iso9001qualityassurance.com).
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Chapter 4 — The Credential Relevancy
Framework

This chapter presents the credential relevancy framework, an extension to trust
negotiation. The credential relevancy framework utilizes the negotiation context
necessary to detect irrelevant or malicious policies as described in Chapter 1. This
chapter presents an overview of the framework, its applications and benefits to trust
negotiation. Details of the framework’s two main components—the ontology context
channel and decision module—comprise Chapters 5 and 6.
4.1

Overview
The credential relevancy framework is an extension to current trust negotiation

systems that lack sufficient context to determine the relevancy of credential requests.
The two main components of the credential relevancy framework are the ontology
context channel and the decision module, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The ontology context channel queries and maintains trust negotiation ontologies describing
relevant negotiation classes. The decision module produces a relevant subset of
credentials based on input from the ontology context channel and local credential
repository.
4.2

Credential relevancy in trust negotiation
As an extension to current trust negotiation systems, the primary application of

the credential relevancy framework augments privacy and user protection from irrelevant or malicious credential requests. Two additional applications for the framework
are predisposed negotiation and relevant credentials first. The following sections describe these three applications of the credential relevancy framework.
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Figure 4.1: An overview of the credential relevancy framework. The decision module
receives a user’s credential repository and the ontology context channel, and produces
a relevant credential subset as output.
4.2.1

Irrelevant or malicious policy detection

Primary application of the credential relevancy framework provides necessary
protection from irrelevant or malicious policies. Figure 4.2 illustrates how the framework integrates with an existing trust negotiation system.
Recalling the scenario from Section 1.2.1, Pat makes a request to renew a driver
license. This request is answered by a policy from the DMV server. Pat’s trust
negotiation agent uses that policy as context for deriving appropriate satisfying
credentials Cderived . Cderived includes Pat’s private disabled and concealed weapon
credentials. These credentials fulfil the policy’s proof of identity requirements, but
reveal information that is private and irrelevant to the negotiation.
Using the credential relevancy framework, the release of Pat’s private and irrelevant credentials will be detected and prevented. Before Cderived is disclosed, the
ontology context channel consults a trust negotiation ontology specifying the rele34

4.2. CREDENTIAL RELEVANCY IN TRUST NEGOTIATION

Figure 4.2: The primary application of the credential relevancy framework—
detection and prevention of irrelevant and malicious policies. The client’s credential
repository is used both by the trust agent to evaluate the DMV policy and by the
decision module to calculate Cderived and Crelevant , respectively. Cderived is relevant
to the current negotiation if it is a subset of Crelevant .
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vant credentials typically used in a driver license renewal negotiation. The decision
module receives this input, together with the credential repository, and produces a
subset of Pat’s credentials Crelevant . If Crelevant includes Cderived , then the set Cderived
are assumed relevant and released. In this scenario, the disabled and concealed
weapon credentials are not found in Crelevant . Pat’s trust agent may reevaluate the
policy, trying different combinations of Cderived and comparing it to Crelevant until
relevant credentials are released. Alternately, Crelevant could replace the credential
repository used by the trust agent to evaluate the policy, producing a subset Cderived
guaranteed to contain relevant credentials.
By using the credential relevancy framework, Pat’s trust agent selects only the
relevant credentials that satisfy the server’s policy. The primary application of the
framework is only invoked as needed (i.e., only on occasions when Pat receives a
policy). Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show use of the framework exclusively by one
negotiating party (rather than both client and server) to simplify the illustrations.
4.2.2

Predisposed negotiation

An alternate application of the credential relevancy framework potentially expedites trust negotiation by pre-selecting and sending credentials that are relevant
to the server in advance. This technique, termed predisposed negotiation, was first
introduced by Leithead et al. [23] and is based on an optimized eager strategy
[31]. Figure 4.3 illustrates predisposed negotiation using the credential relevancy
framework.
The credential phishing scenario from Section 1.2.2 demonstrates the application
of predisposed negotiation. Lynn’s agent begins by collecting relevant context from
a trust negotiation ontology that pertains to HIPAA medial record requests. Using
this context and the current credential repository, the framework produces Crelevant .
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Figure 4.3: Predisposed negotiation produces a subset of relevant credentials to
include with the request to access medical records.
Crelevant is then sent to the server with the initial request for Lynn’s medical records.
Assuming that the hospital’s server is prepared to receive predisposed negotiations,
Lynn’s request could be granted without further negotiation rounds, if Crelevant
satisfies the server’s policy.
Through predisposed negotiation, Lynn gains access to the requested medical
records in one round of negotiation. Predisposed negotiation yields a significant
optimization when complex negotiations involve many rounds1 .
4.2.3

Relevant credentials first

A third application of the credential relevancy framework in trust negotiation involves creating a set of relevant credentials Crelevant for faster searching. Clients and
servers are likely to have many credentials stored in their repositories. Trust negotiation internal processes search credential repositories to select credential sets (e.g.,
in order to calculate Cderived ), find all possible satisfying sets2 , attempt decryption,
1

Predisposed negotiations should not release sensitive credentials, therefore not all negotiations
will reduce to a single round.
2
Smith et al. [35] note that satisfying set generation using a type 2 compliance checker has a
complexity of O(2|U | ), where U is the union of satisfying sets selected from the local credential
repository. As U becomes large (>15), the algorithm becomes impractical due to its exponential
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Figure 4.4: Another application of the credential relevancy framework is to calculate
Crelevant and use that subset instead of the credential repository when decrypting
hidden credentials.
etc. For example, decryption of hidden credentials 3 [6, 8, 15] is computationally
expensive and increases in complexity with the number of credentials in a repository. Figure 4.4 illustrates how the credential relevancy framework optimizes the
decryption of hidden credentials by trying the most relevant credentials first.
Drawing from the scenario of Section 1.2.3, Terry stages a denial of service attack
on a bookstore server by sending a random request encrypted in a hidden credential. The bookstore trust negotiation agent is unable to service the request before
decrypting the hidden credential to verify the specific service requested. To protect
itself from irrelevant requests and minimize the computational resources spent on
this connection, the server derives Crelevant based on its default student discount
negotiation context and uses Crelevant first to attempt decryption. If none of the
credential subset from Crelevant successfully decrypts the hidden credential, then the
server rejects the request. Thus, Terry’s attempt to exhaust the server’s compuproperty.
3
Hidden credentials are an encrypted package containing a resource encrypted using IdentityBased Encryption (IBE) in such a way that a recipient can decrypt it only if the correct credentials
are used. For more information see Bradshaw et al. [6, 15].
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tational resources by sending irrelevant requests encrypted with hidden credentials
will prove ineffective. The server benefits by using Crelevant first when decrypting
hidden credentials.
Using the credential relevancy framework to form a subset of relevant credentials
for early consideration is very useful. However, when sufficient negotiation context
is not available, the credential relevancy framework fails to produce a beneficial
Crelevant subset. This might occur when hidden credentials (or policies) are received
from an unknown source. Negotiations should rarely occur without any context—in
such situations, the user should be wary of malicious behavior.
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Chapter 5 — The Ontology Context Channel

The ontology context channel connects the credential relevancy framework with
trust negotiation ontologies and provides the knowledge base for relevant negotiation
classes. This chapter describes the structure of a trust negotiation ontology, an
analysis of channel trust and availability, and the methods by which negotiation
contexts are aligned with users’ perceptions of those contexts. The chapter concludes
with a summarizing usage example of the ontology context channel.
5.1

Trust negotiation ontology structure
Trust negotiation ontologies, introduced in Section 3.2, contain taxonomies of

negotiation classes with linking properties to pertinent credential attributes. To illustrate, suppose the US government provides a DMV third party trust negotiation
ontology. While state DMV policies vary in their specific requirements, the ontology shown in Figure 5.1 describes general (typical) negotiation classes for DMV
transactions online. These might include transactions such as LicensingNegotiation,
RegistrationNegotiation, or CarHistoryNegotiation. These negotiation classes are
organized into a taxonomy using is a properties that relate more specific to more
general negotiation classes. Thus, according to Figure 5.1, a DriverLicenseRenewalNegotiation is more specific than a LicensingNegotiation, which is more specific than
the most general DMVNegotiation.
Trust negotiation ontologies rely on existing credential attribute definitions. As
introduced in Chapter 1, attributes contained in digital credentials describe properties or characteristics of an entity as asserted by the credential provider. Trust
agents that exchange and process digital credentials must have a method for understanding and deriving meaning from unfamiliar credential attribute names and
41
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Figure 5.1: An example DMV trust negotiation ontology, illustrating the hasTypicalAttribute property that links negotiation classes to credential attributes within
attribute ontologies.
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values. Ontologies conveniently allow the expression, derivation of meaning, and
organization of credential attribute names and legal values. Attribute ontologies1 ,
postulated by Leithead et al. [23], provide a diverse corpus of knowledge referenced
or included in trust negotiation ontologies.
Properties in trust negotiation ontologies that specify typical credential attributes
bridge negotiation classes with attribute ontologies. The binary property hasTypicalAttribute relates the domain of negotiation classes to the range of credential
attributes. Figure 5.1 illustrates four hasTypicalAttribute properties linking the
class VehicleNegotiation to typical attributes: make, model, year, and vin.
5.1.1

Inheritance and Subsumption

Trust negotiation ontology classes linked by the is a property inherit all the
properties of their parents in the hierarchy. For example, a RegistrationNegotiation
class with a hasTypicalAttribute property specifies that an auto insurance credential
attribute is typical of such negotiations. Additionally, each credential attribute of
its parent negotiation class (make, model, year, vin of the class VehicleNegotiation)
is inherited and thus also typical of a vehicle RegistrationNegotiation.
Inherited credential attributes are subsumed by a negotiation subclass when the
hasTypicalAttribute property on that subclass refers to a more specific attribute.
Subsumption only occurs for credential attributes that share an is a property within
an attribute ontology. For example, Figure 5.1 shows the license credential attribute,
inherited from the LicensingNegotiation class, being subsumed by the driver license
attribute for a DriverLicenseRenewalNegotiation class. Subsumption occurs because
the DriverLicenseRenewalNegotiation is a subclass of LicensingNegotiation and the
inherited license attribute is overridden by driver license.
1

Other equivalent structures that organize and provide meaning for credential attributes may
be substituted.

43

CHAPTER 5. THE ONTOLOGY CONTEXT CHANNEL
Generally, when traversing a trust negotiation ontology from the most general to
the most specific class, the number and specificity of credential attributes increases
using inheritance and subsumption. Therefore, to identify the credential attributes
most typical of a current transaction, the most specific negotiation class that best
describes the current transaction should be selected.
However, before negotiation classes can be selected for use, the trust negotiation
ontology itself must be available to the context channel. The next section describes
the accessability of the ontology context channel, including the trust, location and
caching of trust negotiation ontologies.
5.2

Channel availability
The ontology context channel provides trusted access and availability of trust

negotiation ontologies to the credential relevancy framework despite possible limited
connectivity of third party providers.
As suggested in Section 2.3, third parties provide negotiation context through
trust negotiation ontologies. Therefore, the significant problem of trust in ontology
integrity and correctness must be addressed. Digital signatures provide integrity
and non-repudiation, but do not verify the ontology’s correctness. In practice, the
reputation of the third party ontology provider will dictate the general correctness
of the ontology, as the reputation of digital credential providers like VeriSign2 is
trusted today. Web-of-trust systems, used together with digital signatures, furnish
additional trust in ontology correctness by ensuring a general consensus of trust.
Digitally signed ontologies only convey trust in a single static instance of the
ontology at a specific time; however, trust negotiation ontologies will change as
general notions of relevancy shift, trust-agent feedback occurs, and new irrelevant
2

A presumably trustworthy digital credential provider (see http://www.verisign.com).
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or malicious policies appear. Signed trust negotiation ontologies will consequently
need to be updated and re-issued. Expiration dates used in conjunction with digital
signatures, dictate the frequency that the ontology context channel will re-acquire
a trust negotiation ontology.
Once authenticity and integrity are verified, trust negotiation ontologies are
cached because connections to third party providers are not always available. The
ontology context channel uses a list of trusted ontology providers3 to acquire and
cache ontologies from multiple third party providers. Before a trust negotiation
ontology expires, the context channel downloads an updated version from the corresponding provider. Periodic checking, acquisition, and caching of new ontologies
occurs only for trusted providers on the list.
Cached trust negotiation ontologies are stored independently or merged into a
local ontology. The local corpus additionally supports the saving of user preferences by replacing default typical attributes with those authorized by user override.
Futhermore, the single local ontology allows easy exchange of user preferences with
other agents—a valuable extension for future support of web of trust systems.
After downloading, verifying, and caching trust negotiation ontologies, the ontology context channel is invoked when a negotiation begins. A specific negotiation
class must then be selected to provide the most appropriate context for that session.
5.3

Context alignment
Context alignment is the process of matching user perceptions of the current

transaction to the most appropriate negotiation class within the ontology context
channel. This process is different for clients and servers because clients infer negotiation contexts while servers have implied context.
3

Similar to browsers that have a pre-selected list of trusted root authorities.
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For servers, the ontology context channel is pre-configured to use one or more
relevant negotiation classes that best describe the server’s services. Context alignment occurs manually by the system administrator at the time the server is brought
online or scheduled when ontology updates are retrieved.
For clients, context alignment involves inferring a negotiation class based on
the user’s perception of the trust negotiation context. Also, automation and transparency principals dictate that users should not be interrupted; therefore, the ontology context channel supports several methods for identifying user perceptions with
varying degrees of automation. Three methods for context alignment on the client
are identified below in order of increasing automation.
5.3.1

User interaction

For trust negotiations initiated with an unfamiliar server, the user interaction
context alignment method prompts the user to select the most appropriate negotiation class from the ontology context channel4 . The selected negotiation class is
then queried and saved in the local ontology with server agent information (domain,
identifiers, requested resource) to prevent subsequent user interruption.
5.3.2

Content extraction

A more automated alignment method extracts text or other available context
from the protocol used to invoke trust negotiation, analyzes it5 , and identifies the
closest matching negotiation class. For example, an HTML page invokes trust negotiation over HTTP presenting descriptions and other text that establish the context
4

The range of available negotiation classes is determined by the root classes of each trust
negotiation ontology in the channel’s list of trusted ontology providers. While the exact selection
method is implementation-specific, a navigation and selection widget similar to file system tree
navigation would be appropriate.
5
The exact method for analysis is left as an implementation detail. Possible methods include
statistical probability, bayesian methods, or machine learning techniques. The ontology context
channel may filter messages received from the server like a proxy, progressively determining negotiation context while the user navigates.
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basis for a user’s perception of the desired resource or purpose of the negotiation.
HTML text is extracted and analyzed to find the closest matching negotiation class6 .
The user interaction context alignment resolves insufficient or ambiguous protocol
context.
5.3.3

Semantic web

A machine understandable web, made possible through continuing development
of the semantic web [1, 25], may be incorporated with the credential relevancy framework to indicate appropriate negotiation classes based on explicit meta data rather
than derived content as previously discussed. Formalized algorithms for providing
trust on the semantic web are yet in infancy. Currently, semantic web meta data is
trusted if the indicated negotiation class is found within the list of trusted ontologies
maintained by the context channel. The ontology context channel may support additional automated context alignment methods through the semantic web as further
research yields new results.
5.4

Example summary
The following example summarizes the details of the ontology context chan-

nel presented in this chapter. Pat begins a trust negotiation to renew an expired
driver’s license with an online DMV. The list of trusted ontology providers in the
context channel includes one that distributes a DMV ontology. The DMV ontology was previously updated and deemed trustworthy (after verifying its signature,
etc.). Because the channel is configured for user interaction context alignment and
the server is unknown, Pat is prompted to select the most appropriate negotiation class. According to the DMV trust negotiation ontology from Figure 5.1, the
DriverLicenseRenewalNegotiation class is the most specific class that best describes
6

A related but inverse method that uses ontologies to extract information from HTML is described by Embly [10].
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the current negotiation. The ontology context channel queries the hasTypicalAttribute properties for this negotiation class and returns the driver license credential
attribute. Additionally, the name and address attributes inherited from LicensingNegotiation are returned. Credential attributes are provided to the decision
module (discussed in the next chapter), which creates a subset of relevant credentials Crelevant .
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This chapter examines the decision module, the engine that uses the credential
attributes provided by the ontology context channel together with the credential
repository and produces a relevant credential subset. The following section outlines
the process by which typical credential attributes are mapped to credentials in the
repository. Section 6.2 considers the implications of handling irrelevant credentials.
6.1

Mapping methods
The decision module maps credential attributes from the ontology context chan-

nel to credentials available in the repository. The attributes returned by the context
channel correspond with attribute names and identifiers within digital credentials.
For clarity, the terms ontology attribute and credential attribute are used in this
chapter to distinguish between attributes returned by the ontology context channel
and attributes found in digital credentials, respectively.
The simplest mapping method is to match ontology attributes and credential
attributes. If a credential attribute is found in the set of ontology attributes, then
it is considered relevant and included in the result subset.
For trust negotiation systems that support privacy enhancements such as finegrained selective disclosure1 [18], simple matching is sufficient because only the
relevant credential attributes will be disclosed. However, for credentials that include
multiple attributes, the release of one credential could disclose both relevant and
irrelevant attributes.
A minimum/maximum inclusion mapping method provides greater control over
1

Selective disclosure allows individual credential attribute disclosure without revealing all the
attributes contained in a credential.
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the number of attributes per credential that must be considered relevant before its
release. The minimum inclusion approach classifies an entire credential as relevant
if one or more attributes are relevant—this is equivalent to the simple matching
method. Conversely, the maximum inclusion approach classifies a credential as
relevant if and only if all of its attributes are relevant.
Additional fine-grained mapping methods are possible when ontology attributes
contain extra content, like value restrictions. For example, if the ontology context
channel returns an age attribute with a value restriction of ≥17, credentials that
contain the attribute age are only considered relevant if the age value is greater
than 16.
Each of the previous approaches returns boolean relevancy decisions. However,
other mapping methods returning continuous ranges and thresholds may also be
used to select relevant attributes. Common classifiers, likely based on fuzzy logic
or machine learning, provide the ability to generalize and adapt to user preference
over time, given appropriate user feedback. These advanced mapping methods are
beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.2

Handling irrelevance
After classifying the appropriate credentials as relevant, the subset Crelevant is

returned by the decision module. The set of credentials derived from a received
policy Cderived , are deemed relevant if they are a subset of Crelevant . Otherwise the
set defined by the difference Cderived – Crelevant contains the irrelevant credentials.
This section suggests several possible actions to take when irrelevant credentials are
detected (i.e., Cderived – Crelevant 6= Ø).
The worst case occurs when Crelevant and Cderived are disjoint (i.e., all credentials in the set Cderived are irrelevant). This situation dictates that the strongest
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action be taken. The most drastic action is to terminate the negotiation. Other
options include notifying the user, allowing the negotiation to continue at the user’s
discretion, or using the received policy to derive a different credential set2 .
If the context alignment method (see Section 5.3) selects too specific a negotiation class, the result set Cderived may contain many irrelevant credentials. To reduce
the number of irrelevant credentials caused by improper context alignment, the decision module utilizes the trust negotiation ontology’s general-to-specific organization.
By increasing the generality of the selected negotiation class, fewer irrelevant credentials occur at the risk of generalizing beyond the scope of the actual negotiation
context. Negotiation class generalization is performed by traversing the is a property of the current class in the trust negotiation ontology. The process repeats, each
time selecting a negotiation context more general than the last, until a threshold is
reached on the number of irrelevant credentials, the steps of generalization, or the
user is satisfied.
Lastly, the detection of irrelevant credentials may direct the trust negotiation
agent to report to an external module. This approach removes responsibility to
handle irrelevancy from the trust agent, allowing feedback and negotiation decisions
to be made by another entity (e.g., an access control module that uses global system
suspicion levels [30]).
In all cases, the detection of irrelevant credentials should trigger some form of
notification to the user. The decision module ultimately places relevancy determination in the user’s hands. Clients are only interrupted when dramatic (more
than a threshold of) credential irrelevancy is detected. Servers log relevancy results
allowing auditing to uncover trends or problems in their configuration.
2

The backtracking algorithm presented by Smith [35], derives all of the alternate satisfying
credential sets for a given policy.

51

CHAPTER 6. THE DECISION MODULE
6.2.1

Providing feedback

Feedback is important to both negotiating parties when trust negotiations fail
due to policy irrelevancy. Both server and client may utilize negative feedback (failure codes) to fix errors or better comply with typical policy practices (as established
by the trust negotiation ontologies). Positive feedback should reinforce negotiation
class preferences. Because feedback presents privacy concerns, client and server
may customize the content of feedback responses. Basic feedback responses should
include the negotiating agent’s identifier, time/date, the trust negotiation ontology and negotiation class applied, and possibly the irrelevant credential attribute
identifiers (each depending on privacy preferences).
Third party ontology providers will also depend on feedback to update trust negotiation ontologies over time. Thus, similar feedback reporting irrelevant credential
classifications, lack of appropriate negotiation classes, or user surveys should be furnished. The ramifications and a detailed analysis of possible feedback messages are
left for future work.
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This chapter presents the prototype implementation of the credential relevancy
framework, the technologies used to build it, and a summary of its design decisions.
The goal of the prototype implementation is twofold—demonstrate the feasability of
creating a credential relevancy framework by extending an existing trust negotiation
system, and constrain the computational overhead of that system to no more than
an additional 10% compared to baseline trust negotiation.
7.1

Fundamental systems
The prototype implementation extends the functionality of TrustBuilder, a trust

negotiation system. The following sections present an overview of TrustBuilder,
Protégé, and Jena, three fundamental technologies used in the integration, design,
and implementation of the credential relevancy framework.
7.1.1

TrustBuilder

TrustBuilder1 allows two strangers to authenticate by exchanging credentials and
policies [39]. A graphical illustration of TrustBuilder is shown in Figure 7.1.
TrustBuilder makes authentication decisions based on exchanged X.509v3 digital
credentials [17] and TPL policies2 [14]. TrustBuilder’s heart, the compliance checker,
decides if remote access control policies are satisfied by local credentials, and if
remote credentials satisfy local policies. Together the compliance checker, credential
verification module, and vault (containing local credentials and policies) enable the
negotiation strategy to release the resource or disclose further credentials or policies.
1

TrustBuilder was jointly conceptualized at Brigham Young University and the University of
Illinois–Champaign, and developed by the Internet Security Research Lab at BYU.
2
The IBM Alphaworks project Trust Establishment provides the basic components currently
used by TrustBuilder: a compliance checker, the TPL policy language and X.509v3 credentials
with special extensions.
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Figure 7.1: The TrustBuilder authentication agent. Credentials and/or policies
are received from another negotiation agent. A compliance checker receives local
credentials to satisfy remote policies and remote credentials to satisfy local policies.
Credential verification and compliance checker results are analyzed by the agent’s
negotiation strategy, which determines the local policies, credentials, or resources to
disclose.
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7.1.2

Protégé

Protégé3 [12, 16, 28] is an ontology editor and knowledge-base framework created
and maintained by Stanford Medical Informatics. Protégé provides a user interface
for the graphical creation of classes, slots (properties), instances, and other supporting concepts. Modification of the ontology class hierarchy and its class properties
(e.g., transitive, disjoint, functional, symmetric, etc.) are performed in the application’s classes tab. Similar tabs make available the creation and modification of
slots, introduction of instances, ontology visualization, etc. Protégé also includes a
plugin for creating OWL ontologies that alters the default user interface as shown
in the screen shot of Figure 7.2. The OWL ontology created for the prototype is
graphically illustrated in Figure 7.3.
7.1.3

Jena

To query and retrieve meaningful information from the prototype OWL ontology,
Jena4 , an open source semantic web framework, provides an API for loading, parsing,
querying OWL ontologies with RDQL5 and an inference engine for simple reasoning
and information retrieval. Jena’s API includes methods for working with RDF,
OWL, and other semantic web languages in a programmatic environment.
RDQL, similar to OWL-QL [11] consists of collections of RDF statements (i.e.,
a subject–predicate–object triple) with optional variable substitution for any value
in the triple. RDQL syntax is based loosely on SQL. For example, the query used
to retrieve all the attributes for the negotiation class DriverLicenseRenewal in the
prototype’s OWL ontology is shown in Table 7.1.
3

The ontology for this thesis was created using Protégé 3.0 with the OWL Plugin version 2.0
(see http://protege.stanford.edu).
4
Jena 2.2 is an open source project, grown out of work from HP Labs’ Semantic Web Programme
(see http://jena.sourceforge.net).
5
RDQL is an implementation of the SquishQL RDF query language, which itself is derived from
rdfDB.
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Figure 7.2: A screen shot of Protégé 3.0 with OWL plugin displaying a portion of
the ontology class hierarchy developed for the prototype.
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Figure 7.3: The class hierarchy graphically representing is a properties between
classes for three trust negotiation ontologies. Other class interrelationships, such as
the property hasTypicalAttribute, are not shown. The complete ontology description
is included in Appendix A.
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SELECT
WHERE
USING

?attribs


(?X, rdf:type, owl:Restriction)
 (?X, owl:onPropery, tno: hasT ypicalAttribute)





 (?X, owl:someValuesFrom, ?attribs)

(tno: DriverLicenseRenewal, rdfs:subClassOf, ?X)
tno FOR <http://isrl.cs.byu.edu/travisthesis/ontology.owl#>

Table 7.1: The RDQL query that retrieves the attributes for a DriverLicenseRenewal
negotiation class along the property hasTypicalAttribute. The variable ?attribs is
assigned the query results based on each limiting conjunction in the WHERE clause.
The USING statement associates a shortcut for the complete ontology namespace
within the query.
Leveraging TrustBuilder, Protégé, and Jena, the credential relevancy framework
can be implemented as an extension to TrustBuilder using Java.
7.2

Design decisions
Table 7.2 summarizes the implementation design decisions for the credential

relevancy framework. Specific items are expounded below.
For simplicity, both client and server use the same ontology, which combines
three trust negotiation ontologies and nine dependent attribute ontologies. The
trust negotiation ontologies contain typical negotiation classes used for each motivating scenario from Chapter 1 (i.e., the DMV, medical records, and bookstore
scenarios), focusing on the relevant negotiation described in each scenario (i.e., the
driver license renewal, HIPAA medical record request, and student discount). Appendix A contains the complete OWL ontology specified in XML.
The optimization alluded to in Section 4.2.1 is employed to minimize the overhead of repeatedly computing Crelevant , hence the subset Cderived is input to the
decision module to determine the relevant subset.
Each scenario’s policies are designed with varying levels of irrelevancy for per58
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Design decisions
Ontology design

Ontology language

Ontology location
Ontology availability

Ontology caching

Attribute ontology

Client context

Server context
Mapping method

Irrelevant credentials

To consolidate space and facilitate ease of development, all
supporting attribute and trust negotiation ontologies were
developed jointly and co-located in a single file.
OWL was chosen as the ontology language for the prototype because it is the most recent standard to be recommended by the W3C.
A third party webserver hosts the ontology, allowing each
agent to query it through RDQL.
For simplicity, both client and server reference the same
ontology. The ontology is assumed previously authenticated with no expiration date.
Jena loads the ontology entirely into memory at startup—
therefore, all queries and results are cached. Local ontology
caching (preservation of user preferences) is disabled.
Lack of global credential attribute definitions for TE credentials necessitates the creation of local definitions of attribute ontologies. Attribute ontology classes are attribute
names that correspond to TE credential type values (see
mapping method below).
The user interaction context alignment method allows for
the client to select the most relevant negotiation class from
any of the three trust negotiation ontologies at transaction
commencement. This is done via the TrustBuilder configuration file.
Servers are pre-configured to use a specific negotiation
class.
The decision module uses the minimal inclusion matching
method to associate ontology attributes with TE credential
types. (TE credential types are unique identifiers for each
credential designed to have one-to-one correspondence to
ontology attributes. Thus, the minimal inclusion matching
method reduces to the simple matching method.)
For worst-case performance testing, the credential relevancy framework assumes that irrelevant or sensitive credentials are always disclosed. Therefore, no warning dialog
is presented to the user. Irrelevant credential disclosures
are automatically logged and negotiation continues.

Table 7.2: The prototype design decisions for creation of the credential relevancy
framework extension to TrustBuilder.
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formance testing (see Chapter 8). During a negotiation, the prototype assumes
that the user always elects to release irrelevant credentials when presented with a
choice. Thus performance measures in the next chapter represent a worst-case or
upper bound on the execution time because trust negotiation always continues despite the detection of irrelevant credential requests. To simplify performance testing,
irrelevancy is logged to a file instead of presented to the user for confirmation.
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This chapter presents the analysis of the prototype credential relevancy framework.
Because the prototype is a proof-of-concept implementation, the analysis is not
intended to showcase its efficiency or thoroughly examine the tradeoffs in design
decision performance. Rather, it focuses on the feasibility of creating a credential
relevancy framework, by demonstrating that it can be implemented with minimal
impact to an existing baseline trust negotiation system. Minimal impact is defined
as utilizing less than 10% of the total execution time for the combined system.
This chapter describes three scenarios used for performance testing, presents the
total execution time results, illustrates an execution time profile of TrustBuilder,
and estimates performance over larger and more complex trust negotiations.
8.1

Scenario setup
To validate the computational overhead of the credential relevancy framework,

three trust negotiation scenarios were selected that span the range from large and
complicated to small and simple. These three scenarios allow the generalization and
extrapolation of the computational effects of the credential relevancy framework as
negotiations get larger and more complex.
The first scenario is based on the DMV driver license renewal used throughout
this thesis. The baseline DMV scenario1 uses nineteen combined credentials in both
repositories and nineteen policy groups2 before granting the license renewal. The
trust negotiation progression for this scenario is depicted in Figure 8.1-A.
1

Each baseline scenario refers to a trust negotiation previously created in which all policies
exchanged are assumed relevant to the negotiation.
2
The number of policy groups within a TPL policy is a rough estimate of its complexity. Other
contributing factors apply, such as role expression complexity, and number and complexity of
possible combinations of satisfying sets.
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The second baseline scenario is a request for medical records. The medical
records scenario employs fourteen credentials with eight policy groups. This baseline
scenario progresses according to Figure 8.1-B.
Finally, Figure 8.1-C shows the baseline bookstore scenario—the simplest of
the three scenarios. The student discount request is granted after three rounds of
negotiation, in which nine total credentials and seven policy groups are considered.
Three cases of potentially malicious negotiations supplement each of the three
preceding scenarios. For each scenario, the existing baseline policies were modified
to create two additional semi and none relevant cases. The third all relevant case
(baseline) remained unchanged for comparison with the other two cases. These cases
are used to extrapolate the effect that policy relevancy has on the credential relevancy framework, while the specific scenario remains constant. The modified semiand none-relevant policies from each scenario along with illustrations describing the
alternate negotiation progress are included in Appendix B.
To achieve accurate graphs of execution time, without factoring in time to send
and receive trust negotiation messages, the JProfiler3 tool was used to precisely analyze the quantity of time spent in each class and method of the credential relevancy
framework extension and TrustBuilder. JProfiler was attached to both client and
server such that only cumulative execution time on each negotiation agent applied
to the results. The Java RMI protocol minimized communication overhead between
the two agents during negotiation analysis. Figure 8.2 illustrates the profiling architecture.

3

JProfiler version 3.3.1, by ej-technologies, is an application and server profiling tool (see
http://www.ej-technologies.com/products/jprofiler/overview.html).

62

8.1. SCENARIO SETUP

Figure 8.1: Three baseline scenarios illustrating the negotiation progress for (A) the
driver license renewal, (B) medical records, and (C) student discount negotiations.
The policies exchanged include the role expressions that specify the logical combination of policy groups required to satisfy the policy. Role expressions are shown
within square brackets.
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Figure 8.2: The profiling architecture for performance analysis. The profilers measured cumulative execution time on both client and server TrustBuilder (with and
without the credential relevancy framework). The individual execution times for
client and server are summed for the results of Table 8.1.
8.2

Results
Results were calculated locally on a single Pentium 4, 3.0 GHz processor with 1

GB of RAM running the Windows XP operating system.
Table 8.1 compares the total execution time of the three scenarios with their
baseline, semi-relevant, and none-relevant cases to the total execution time of the
same scenarios running the credential relevancy framework. Execution time measurements for TrustBuilder without the credential relevancy framework were gathered prior to any code modification. Additionally, the following list delimits other
configuration details and settings used throughout the data collection process.
• Full debugging output ensured visual negotiation progress.
• Each execution time measurement is the sum of 50 interleaved negotiations.
The server handled no more than ten simultaneous negotiations at a time,
starting a new negotiation whenever another concluded. Thus, to obtain an
estimate4 of the average time per negotiation, divide the time by 50.
4

The resultant average is the execution time for one trust negotiation given that nine others
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Total execution time spent negotiating in milliseconds
Baseline
Semi-relevant
Scenario
w/out
with
percent
w/out
with
percent
frameframeincrease
frameframeincrease
name
work
work
work
work
DMV
1,200,662
1,232,495
2.65%
402,528,908 402,738,766 0.05%
Medical records 561,363
576,508
2.7%
847,063
885,192
4.5%
Bookstore
445,039
486,766
9.38%
462,370
533,462
15.38%
Average
over 735,688
765,256
4.02%
134,612,780 134,719,140 0.08%
each scenario
None-relevant
Average over each case
Scenario
w/out
with
percent
w/out
with
percent
frameframeincrease
frameframeincrease
name
work
work
work
work
DMV
1,126,793
1,163,724
3.28%
134,952,121 135,044,995 0.07%
Medical records 900,141
986,385
9.58%
769,522
816,028
6.04%
Bookstore
414,965
447,366
7.81%
440,791
489,198
10.98%
Average
over 813,966
865,825
6.37%
45,387,478 45,450,074 0.14%
each scenario
Table 8.1: Comparison of total execution time for TrustBuilder with and without
utilizing the credential relevancy framework (CRF).
• Each measurement represents the sum total of the execution time spent in
the client and server TrustBuilder agents (including the credential relevancy
framework as indicated). No RMI message passing overhead is included.
• The percent increase is calculated as

(with

framework − w/out framework)
w/out framework

• For all credential relevancy framework measurements, both client and server
use the framework and reference the same trust negotiation ontology. A Tomcat 4 server, running locally, hosts the trust negotiation ontology.
From the results tabulated in Table 8.1, only the bookstore scenario in the semi
relevant case incurred more than the goal of 10% additional computation overhead.
This anomaly is explained due to the high variability of simple trust negotiations
spending less time negotiating in general due to their simple policies and few credentials.
A more typical trend can be seen in the moderately complex medical records
scenario. As policies become less relevant, execution time in the credential relevancy
are also executing concurrently.
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framework increases from the baseline’s 2.7% to 9.58% in the none relevant case.
This is more typical of the expected trend.
Averages for the semi relevant case are largely skewed because of the exceptionally long time spent negotiating in the DMV scenario. This occurred because
the client was forced to initiate the backtracking algorithm (see Smith et al. [35])
to generate all the possible combinations of satisfying credential sets5 . This timeconsuming algorithm minimizes the impact of the credential relevancy algorithm in
this instance.
8.3

Execution time profile
In order to further visualize the impact of the credential relevancy framework on

TrustBuilder, the total execution times from Table 8.1 are broken down by scenario
to show the percentage of time spent in each of TrustBuilder’s modules. Figures 8.3,
8.4, and 8.5, graph the percent of execution time spent in TrustBuilder’s significant
modules6 for the driver license, medical records, and bookstore scenario, respectively.
Figure 8.6 averages the percentages reported in the previous three figures to show
a generalized summary.
As shown in Figure 8.6, the credential relevancy framework itself incurs less
overhead on trust negotiation than indicated by the total execution time table.
Averaging the baseline, semi and none relevant cases for the credential relevancy
framework module of Figure 8.6 yields an average impact of 2.22% overall.
The cryptography processes involved in trust negotiation (i.e., certificate signing/verifying, certificate hashing, credential ownership verification, etc.) and logic
contained in the negotiation strategy generally consume the most execution time
5

The exact proceeding of the DMV semi relevant negotiation is illustrated in Figure B.1 from
Appendix B.
6
Total method and class execution time for less-significant modules are aggregated into a general
module category for convenience in graphing.
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Figure 8.3: Comparison of five modules in TrustBuilder and their percentage of
execution time for each relevancy case in the DMV scenario.

Figure 8.4: Comparison of five modules in TrustBuilder and their percentage of
execution time for each relevancy case in the medical records scenario.
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Figure 8.5: Comparison of five modules in TrustBuilder and their percentage of
execution time for each relevancy case in the bookstore scenario.

Figure 8.6: Averages over the DMV, medical records, and bookstore scenarios for
each of the five modules in TrustBuilder.
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Figure 8.7: Trend graph based on data from Table 8.1, showing that as negotiations
get more complex, the overall computational effect on the baseline trust negotiation
decreases.
in TrustBuilder. As before, the DMV semi-relevant case in Figure 8.3, is largely
skewed due to the backtracking algorithm. As shown, the backtracking algorithm
spends the most time in the compliance checker (and also generating output when
debugging is enabled).
8.4

Generalizations
An estimate of the performance of larger, more complex negotiations can be made

based on previous results. Figure 8.7 illustrates the downward trend of the percentage of execution time spent in the credential relevancy framework as negotiations
increase in complexity. This is not surprising considering the credential relevancy
framework’s small impact on the overall negotiation (see Figure 8.6). As negotiations get more complex more time is spent in the negotiation strategy, compliance
checker, and credential verification modules.
The downward trend would seem to suggest that as negotiations become larger
the effect of the credential relevancy framework would dwindle to nothing. However,
this trend fails to consider an increase in trust negotiation ontology complexity.
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With increased complexity, ontology queries take longer to complete and network
overhead caused by those queries become a concern (e.g., because of the distributed
nature of ontologies). Additional factors, such as the complexity of the context
alignment method, can contribute to the overall impact of the credential relevancy
framework. Contrary to the trend visible in Figure 8.7, it is expected that the effect
of the CRF will hold relatively constant or slightly increase as negotiations become
more complex, due to the other factors previously mentioned.
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Trust negotiation is the process of building trust between strangers in open systems
through the exchange of digital credentials and policies. Negotiating agents are
presently capable of verifying the relevance of received credentials, but lack sufficient
context to verify policy relevance.
Previous research assumes that policies “bargain in good faith” by requesting
credentials that further the negotiation progress. This thesis challenges that assumption by suggesting that policies cannot be guaranteed to “play fair” in actual
open systems. Policies that do not “play fair” naively or intensionally request information that exploits automated trust negotiation by causing the disclosure of
sensitive or unrelated credentials. Trust negotiation authentication systems cannot
be trusted while this open avenue for attack exists. To ensure the security of trust
negotiation, protection from irrelevant or malicious policies must exist.
Additional context is required to protect users from policies that do not “play
fair.” However, current policies lack sufficient context to establish their relevance
to a negotiation. Presently, policies establish context for credentials, but no context
currently exists to establish policy relevance.
This thesis presents the credential relevancy framework as one solution providing
relevant external context. The framework utilizes trust negotiation ontologies that
contain typical negotiation classes and attributes. Trust negotiation ontologies and
credential repositories are used to derive a subset of relevant credentials.
Finally, a prototype demonstrates the framework’s feasibility. An analysis of the
prototype shows that its cumulative effect on trust negotiation is minor (less than
10% extra computational overhead).
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9.1

Contributions
This thesis makes several important contributions to trust negotiation and com-

puter science. It raises awareness of policies that do not “play fair,” provides a
prototype framework from which to base future systems, broadens the scope of
what is considered relevant, conceptualizes a new approach to using ontologies to
provide context, and promotes correct policy design.
This work identifies an area of trust negotiation that has been largely ignored—
the consequences of irrelevant or malicious policies. Malicious policies cause phishing
attacks (stealing sensitive information) or request information that is not relevant to
the negotiation, compromising user privacy and security. By exposing this problem
and proposing a solution, current and future trust negotiation systems may better
protect themselves from irrelevant and malicious policies.
The prototype credential relevancy framework is the first to incorporate sufficient context information to allow discrimination between relevant and irrelevant
credential solicitations in trust negotiation. The prototype respects the automation
and transparency goals of trust negotiation by including several methods of context
alignment for verifying policy relevance.
Trust negotiation literature previously used the term relevant only to relate a
set of credentials to a policy. This work broadens the meaning of relevant to include
policies and their relation to negotiation classes.
This thesis extends the published ideas of Leithead et al. [23] by formally defining
trust negotiation ontology structure. Merging ontologies and trust negotiation opens
a novel area of future research.
Trust negotiation ontologies encourage correct policy design by modeling the
typical attributes requested during a trust negotiation, according to third party
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domain experts. Adherence to authoritative trust negotiation ontologies helps to
standardize and promote correct policy design and encourages widespread policy
unity.
9.2

Future work
This thesis pioneers the synthesis of trust negotiation and ontology research. As a

relatively new combined research area, substantial future work remains. Future work
falls into two categories—independent maturing technologies and the application of
the credential relevancy framework.
9.2.1

Maturing technologies

Ontology research is a large and active field [7]. This thesis incorporates many
innovations and techniques for ontology creation, maintenance, deployment, query,
and knowledge encapsulation. Advances in ontology research may provide new solutions within the credential relevancy framework.
This thesis suggests the use of digital signatures to cryptographically sign and
verify the content of an ontology as authored and issued from a third party provider.
However, the digital signature itself only conveys trust in the integrity and authenticity of the content. Verification of the correctness of the ontology itself is an open
challenge. Because trust negotiation ontologies encapsulate human perceptions of
typical relevant attributes, their correctness may be impossible to certify. An approximation of ontology correctness, according to the general public or other domain
experts, may be obtained using a social reputation system.
Web of trust reputation systems offer the most plausible and practical solution
for auditing ontology correctness. Because trust negotiation ontologies are domain
specific, their independent rating by frequent users or domain experts supplements
content credibility and augments public trust.
73

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Size and scalability analysis for trust negotiation ontologies offer another area of
future research. As trust negotiation ontology content grows, how will the performance of query results be affected? How should large ontologies be presented to the
user for negotiation class selection when user interaction context alignment is used?
Research into machine-assisted decision making will become increasingly important
as ontologies become increasingly large and complex.
Semantic web research is closely tied to the concepts of the credential relevancy
framework. The semantic web consists of a multi-layered collection of technologies
ranging from a foundation of URI s and XML to proof and trust in the upper
layers. Trust negotiation, extended with the credential relevancy framework, could
integrate into the proof and trust layers of the semantic web. For example, a trust
negotiation-enabled semantic web agent would utilize the semantic web’s underlying
technologies such as logic proofs to satisfy policies, and ontologies to make relevancy
decisions automatically.
Investigation of alternative sources of context for trust negotiation may lead
to novel approaches for determining relevancy. In theory, alternative context information merged with current policies may produce enhanced policies capable of
providing proof of their own relevance.
9.2.2

Aspects of the credential relevancy framework

Additional future work exists within the credential relevancy framework itself,
including: combined digital credential-ontologies, the exchange of user preferences,
advanced context alignment techniques, analysis of current irrelevancy actions, and
feedback techniques.
Digital credentials used in TrustBuilder currently contain attributes that are distinct from the attributes contained in attribute ontologies (see Section 5.1). Future
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work may explore the idea of merging the logic, expressive power, and reasoning capabilities of ontologies with digital credentials. In theory, smart digital credentials
may contain the context necessary for equipped trust agents to automatically derive
meaning from their attributes.
Section 2.3 presents four possible sources for locating a source of relevancy context. This thesis chose to focus on drawing context source from a third party.
However, a peer-to-peer negotiation context exchange system (e.g., using social reputation systems) is a very practical alternative to the third party approach. Ontologies for encapsulating negotiation context may yet be important to such an exchange
system.
The context channel caches ontologies because an active connection to the provider
is not always available (see Section 5.2). These cached ontologies are maintained
separately or merged into a single local ontology. One stated advantage for maintaining a local ontology is to facilitate the exchange of user preferences with other
trust agents. User preferences may act as an auxiliary source of trust when exchanged in a reputation system. Current reputation systems recognize the need for
context-based trust metrics, and local ontologies already bind negotiation context
to each user preference.
Context alignment involves inferring the client’s negotiation context and choosing an appropriate negotiation class before a transaction begins (see Section 5.3).
The problem of aligning a user’s perception to a machine-understandable classification is an open research problem. Future work may exploit expert knowledge
in the disciplines of artificial intelligence, machine learning and human-computer
interaction to provide new methods for context alignment.
Further study of the actions for handling irrelevant credentials is needed (see
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Section 6.2). What response to irrelevant credential requests best suit client or
server, and how should trust agents respond?
Additionally, feedback is important to clients, servers, and third party ontology
providers (see Section 6.2.1). Considerations for feedback responses include: format,
frequency, and protocol for secure transmission.
Chapter 4 introduces two additional use cases for the credential relevancy framework: predisposed negotiation and relevant credentials first. While each case is illustrated by example, the implementations of these systems were not created nor
analyzed in this thesis.
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Appendix A — OWL Ontology Source

This appendix contains the OWL ontology source for the prototype implementation
of the credential relevancy framework. The complete ontology is broken up into
sections based on the separate attribute and trust negotiation ontologies for easy
reference.
A.1

Header information

<?xml version="1.0"?> <rdf:RDF
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"
xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"
xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#"
xmlns="http://isrl.cs.byu.edu/travisthesis/ontology.owl#"
xml:base="http://isrl.cs.byu.edu/travisthesis/ontology.owl">
<owl:Ontology rdf:about=""/>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Attribute">
<rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
Master super-class for all attributes
</rdfs:comment>
</owl:Class>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute">
<rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
>describes the attributes that are typical of this class</rdfs:comment>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#ObjectProperty"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Attribute"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Negotiation"/>
</owl:TransitiveProperty>

A.2
A.2.1

Supplementary attribute ontologies
HospitalStaff

<owl:Class rdf:ID="Billing">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="HospitalStaff"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MedicalPractitioner">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#HospitalStaff"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DeskEmployee">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Billing"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Records"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="NurseRS">
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<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MedicalPractitioner"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MidwifeCNM">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MedicalPractitioner"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Janitorial">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#HospitalStaff"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DoctorMD">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MedicalPractitioner"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Records">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#HospitalStaff"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#HospitalStaff">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attribute"/>
</owl:Class>

A.2.2

University

<owl:Class rdf:about="#University">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attribute"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Faculty">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CurrentMember"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Professor">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Faculty"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Salary">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="UniversityEmployed"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PartTime">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Hourly"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="AssistantTeachingProfessor">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TeachingProfessor"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Graduate">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Student"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CurrentMember">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="University"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#UniversityEmployed">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CurrentMember"/>
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</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Alumni">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#University"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="AssistantProfessor">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Professor"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="AssociateTeachingProfessor">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#TeachingProfessor"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="FullTime">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Hourly"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="AssociateProfessor">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Professor"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PostGraduate">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Student"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Hourly">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#UniversityEmployed"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#TeachingProfessor">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Professor"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Undergraduate">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Student"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Student">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CurrentMember"/>
</owl:Class>

A.2.3

Certification

<owl:Class rdf:ID="Certification">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Attribute"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#BusinessCertification">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Certification"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#GovernmentCertification"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CiscoProfessional">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CiscoExpert"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CiscoCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CiscoAssociate"/>
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</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NetworkPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ServerPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#APlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#e-BizPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#i-NetPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SecurityPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CDIAPlus"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MCDST">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MCSA"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MicrosoftCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MCSE"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MCAD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MCT"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MCDBA"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MCSD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PrivacySealCertification">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ITCertification"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="BusinessCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="LinuxPlus">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="APlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="SecurityPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="HTIPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="e-BizPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CTTPlus"/>
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</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="NetworkPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CDIAPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ServerPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="i-NetPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSA">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSE"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCDST"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCAD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCT"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCDBA"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSE">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCAD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCDBA"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCDST"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCT"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSA"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CCNP">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CCIP"/>
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</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CCDP"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CiscoProfessional"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CCSP"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#HTIPlus">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#i-NetPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#NetworkPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#e-BizPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CDIAPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#APlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SecurityPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ServerPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCAD">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCDST"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCDBA"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSA"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCT"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSE"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="USCertification">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="GovernmentCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
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<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="StateCertification"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CCNA">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CCDA"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CiscoAssociate"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CCSP">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CCDP"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CiscoProfessional"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CCNP"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CCIP"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CDIAPlus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#NetworkPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#e-BizPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#APlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ServerPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#i-NetPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SecurityPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ServerPlus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CDIAPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#e-BizPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SecurityPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
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<owl:Class rdf:about="#i-NetPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#APlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#NetworkPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#GovernmentCertification">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Certification"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#BusinessCertification"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#NetworkPlus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CDIAPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#e-BizPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#i-NetPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#APlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ServerPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SecurityPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CCDA">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CCNA"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CiscoAssociate"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCDBA">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCAD"/>
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<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCT"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSA"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCDST"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSE"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#i-NetPlus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NetworkPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CDIAPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ServerPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SecurityPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#e-BizPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#APlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#e-BizPlus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#APlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ServerPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#i-NetPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NetworkPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CDIAPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SecurityPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#StateCertification">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#GovernmentCertification"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#USCertification"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#APlus">
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<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#e-BizPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NetworkPlus"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SecurityPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CDIAPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ServerPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#i-NetPlus"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CCIP">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CCNP"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CiscoProfessional"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CCSP"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CCDP"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SecurityPlus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#e-BizPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ServerPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NetworkPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#i-NetPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CDIAPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#APlus"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CTTPlus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CDIAPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ServerPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#e-BizPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NetworkPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#APlus"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#LinuxPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#HTIPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ProjectPlus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#i-NetPlus"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SecurityPlus"/>
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</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CiscoAssociate">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CiscoExpert"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CiscoCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CiscoProfessional"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CiscoExpert">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CiscoProfessional"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CiscoCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CiscoAssociate"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CCDP">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CCNP"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CiscoProfessional"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CCSP"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CCIP"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CCIE">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CiscoExpert"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CiscoCertification">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ITCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCT">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSD"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCAD"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSE"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCDBA"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSA"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCDST"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompTIACertification">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CiscoCertification"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ITCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MCSD">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCAD"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSE"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCDST"/>
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<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCT"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCSA"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MCDBA"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ITCertification">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PrivacySealCertification"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#BusinessCertification"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MicrosoftCertification">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CompTIACertification"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ITCertification"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CiscoCertification"/>
</owl:Class>

A.2.4

Provider

<owl:Class rdf:about="#Provider">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attribute"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="HealthCareProvider">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Provider"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PhysicalTherapyProvider">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Provider"/>
</owl:Class>

A.2.5

USGovernmentDepartment

<owl:Class rdf:about="#USGovernmentDepartment">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PoliticalDivisions"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PersonalInformation"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attribute"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Payment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DepartmentOfMotorVehicles">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DepartmentOfState"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DepartmentOfHeathAndHumanServices"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="USGovernmentDepartment"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DepartmentOfHeathAndHumanServices">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#USGovernmentDepartment"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DepartmentOfState"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DepartmentOfMotorVehicles"/>
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</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DepartmentOfState">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DepartmentOfHeathAndHumanServices"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DepartmentOfMotorVehicles"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#USGovernmentDepartment"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#StateMedicalBoard">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#DepartmentOfHeathAndHumanServices"/>
</owl:Class>

A.2.6

PoliticalDivisions

<owl:Class rdf:about="#PoliticalDivisions">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PersonalInformation"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Attribute"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#USGovernmentDepartment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Payment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="State">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Country"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PoliticalDivisions"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="UnitedStatesOfAmerica">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Country"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Country">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#State"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#PoliticalDivisions"/>
</owl:Class>

A.2.7

Payment

<owl:Class rdf:about="#Payment">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attribute"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PoliticalDivisions"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PersonalInformation"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#USGovernmentDepartment"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompanyCheck">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Check"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PayrollCheck"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PersonalCheck"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PersonalCheck">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CompanyCheck"/>
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</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Check"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PayrollCheck"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#PayrollCheck">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Check"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CompanyCheck"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PersonalCheck"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="VISACard">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CreditCard"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="AmericanExpressCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DiscoverCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MasterCardCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PaymentVerification">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Check"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="OnlinePayment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CreditCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Payment"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MoneyOrder"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DiscoverCard">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#AmericanExpressCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MasterCardCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#VISACard"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CreditCard"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MasterCardCard">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CreditCard"/>
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</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DiscoverCard"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#AmericanExpressCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#VISACard"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CreditCard">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Payment"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#OnlinePayment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MoneyOrder"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Check"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PaymentVerification"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#AmericanExpressCard">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#VISACard"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MasterCardCard"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DiscoverCard"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CreditCard"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MoneyOrder">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CreditCard"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#OnlinePayment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Payment"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Check"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PaymentVerification"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Check">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Payment"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MoneyOrder"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PaymentVerification"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#OnlinePayment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CreditCard"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#OnlinePayment">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MoneyOrder"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PaymentVerification"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Check"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Payment"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CreditCard"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="SalesReceipt">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#PaymentVerification"/>
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</owl:Class>

A.2.8

PersonalInformation

<owl:Class rdf:ID="LastName">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Name"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DriversLicense">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ID"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#VoterRegCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Passport"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#IDCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Address">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ID"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DisabledStatus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Name"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PersonalInformation"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#PersonalInformation">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Attribute"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#USGovernmentDepartment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#PoliticalDivisions"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Payment"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MarriedName">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Name"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="FirstName">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Name"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Name">
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<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ID"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DisabledStatus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Address"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#PersonalInformation"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#ID">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DisabledStatus"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Address"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Name"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#PersonalInformation"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PreferredName">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Name"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#VoterRegCard">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ID"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#IDCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DriversLicense"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Passport"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="StudentID">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SSCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MilitaryID"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#IDCard"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Passport">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#IDCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#VoterRegCard"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DriversLicense"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ID"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#IDCard">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Passport"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DriversLicense"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ID"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#VoterRegCard"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CurrentAddress">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Address"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PreviousAddress"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#MilitaryID">
<owl:disjointWith>
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<owl:Class rdf:about="#SSCard"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#IDCard"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#StudentID"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DisabledStatus">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Name"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ID"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#PersonalInformation"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Address"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SSCard">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#StudentID"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#MilitaryID"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#IDCard"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#PreviousAddress">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CurrentAddress"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Address"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MiddleName">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Name"/>
</owl:Class>

A.2.9

Store

<owl:Class rdf:ID="ElectronicsStore">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Store"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="SuperMarket">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Store"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Store">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Attribute"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DepartmentStore">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Store"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ThriftStore">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Store"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Bookstore">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Store"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="RetailStore">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Store"/>
</owl:Class>

A.3
A.3.1

Trust negotiation ontologies
BusinessDiscount

<owl:Class rdf:about="#BusinessDiscount">
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<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Negotiation"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ClubMembershipDiscount">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="AcademicDiscount"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="SeniorDiscount"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="EmployeeDiscount"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="BusinessDiscount"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="EmeritusDiscout">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="UniversityDiscount"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#AcademicDiscount">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#BusinessDiscount"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="#Store"/>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ClubMembershipDiscount"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SeniorDiscount"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#EmployeeDiscount"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#EmployeeDiscount">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SeniorDiscount"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#AcademicDiscount"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ClubMembershipDiscount"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#BusinessDiscount"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#SeniorDiscount">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ClubMembershipDiscount"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#AcademicDiscount"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#EmployeeDiscount"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#BusinessDiscount"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="K12Discout">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#AcademicDiscount"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TeacherDiscount">
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<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#K12Discout"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="StudentDiscount">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#K12Discout"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Student"/>
</owl:someValuesFrom>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#UniversityDiscount"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="FacultyDiscount">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#UniversityDiscount"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#UniversityDiscount">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#University"/>
</owl:someValuesFrom>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#AcademicDiscount"/>
</owl:Class>

A.3.2

MedicalInformationExchange

<owl:Class rdf:ID="MedicalInformationExchange">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Negotiation"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ClaimStatusInquiryOrResponse">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="HIPAANegotiation"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ReferralAuthorizationInquiryResponse">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#HIPAANegotiation"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#HIPAANegotiation">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Provider"/>
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</owl:someValuesFrom>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MedicalInformationExchange"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PaymentOrRemittanceAdvice">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#HIPAANegotiation"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="EligibilityInquiryOrResponse">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#HIPAANegotiation"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MedicalRecordsRequest">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="#MedicalPractitioner"/>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="StateMedicalBoard"/>
</owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#HIPAANegotiation"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ClaimsOrEncounterInformation">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#HIPAANegotiation"/>
</owl:Class>

A.3.3

DMV

<owl:Class rdf:about="#DMV">
<rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
>Department of motor vehicles</rdfs:comment>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="#Certification"/>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="#State"/>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Negotiation"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="RegistrationRenewal">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Registration"/>

105

APPENDIX A. OWL ONTOLOGY SOURCE
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Licensing">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="VoterRegCard"/>
</owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:ID="hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Passport"/>
</owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="MilitaryID"/>
</owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="IDCard"/>
</owl:someValuesFrom>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
<owl:someValuesFrom>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="SSCard"/>
</owl:someValuesFrom>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DMV"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DriversLicenseFirstTime">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Licensing"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Accident">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Reports"/>
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</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DrivingRecord"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CarHistory"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="CarInsuranceQuotes"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DrivingRecord">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Reports"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Accident"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CarHistory"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CarInsuranceQuotes"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DisabledPlates">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="LicensePlateNeg"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="ChangeOfAddress">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DMV"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Financial">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DMV"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Reports">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#DMV"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Registration">
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TransferOfTitle"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#LicensePlateNeg"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TitleRegistration"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#TransferOfTitle">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Registration"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#LicensePlateNeg"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#TitleRegistration"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
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<owl:Class rdf:about="#LicensePlateNeg">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Registration"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TransferOfTitle"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#TitleRegistration"/>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DriversLicenseRenewal">
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="#CreditCard"/>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty>
<owl:TransitiveProperty rdf:about="#hasTypicalAttribute"/>
</owl:onProperty>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="#DriversLicense"/>
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Licensing"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CarInsuranceQuotes">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DrivingRecord"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Accident"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Reports"/>
<owl:disjointWith>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CarHistory"/>
</owl:disjointWith>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#TitleRegistration">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#DMV"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="#CarHistory">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CarInsuranceQuotes"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Accident"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DrivingRecord"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Reports"/>
</owl:Class>
</rdf:RDF>
<!-- Created with Protege (with OWL Plugin 2.0 beta, Build 242)
http://protege.stanford.edu -->
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This appendix contains a description of the modifications made to each of the three
scenarios used in the analysis of the credential relevancy framework prototype, together with their TPL policies. For additional explanation of TPL policy syntax
and semantics see Herzberg et al. [14].
B.1

DMV negotiation server policy

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE POLICY SYSTEM "Policy.dtd">
<!-- DRIVERS LICENSE Scenario: Department of Public Safety Policy (Server) -->
<POLICY>
<GROUP NAME="self" />
<GROUP NAME="USCountry">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION ID="us_cert" TYPE="Country" FROM="self">
<FUNCTION>
<EQ><FIELD ID="us_cert" NAME="CountryCode" /><CONST>US</CONST></EQ>
</FUNCTION>
</INCLUSION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="ForeignCountry">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION ID="foreign_cert" TYPE="Country" FROM="self">
<FUNCTION>
<NE><FIELD ID="foreign_cert" NAME="CountryCode" /><CONST>US</CONST></NE>
</FUNCTION>
</INCLUSION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="InState">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION ID="instate_cert" TYPE="State" FROM="USCountry">
<FUNCTION>
<EQ><FIELD ID="instate_cert" NAME="StateCode" /><CONST>IL</CONST></EQ>
</FUNCTION>
</INCLUSION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="OutofState">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION ID="outstate_cert" TYPE="State" FROM="USCountry">
<FUNCTION>
<NE><FIELD ID="outstate_cert" NAME="StateCode" /><CONST>IL</CONST></NE>
</FUNCTION>
</INCLUSION>
</RULE>
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Figure B.1: The semi-relevant DMV negotiation extends the baseline DMV negotiation by adding three new policy groups SpecialPermits, CurrentVehicleTitle, and
Employment Status. The existing groups ResidencyPersonalData and ProofDateOfBirth were also extended. The semi-relevant negotiation employs backtracking [35]
after the third round to recompute a satisfying set of credentials. The server in this
scenario is unable to satisfy the client’s USGovtCertification and Corporation policy
groups (i.e., the server lacks the appropriate credentials), yet it can still usurp the
client’s irrelevant credentials. Both illustrated negotiations omit redundant policy
requests during each round.
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B.1. DMV NEGOTIATION SERVER POLICY
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="CCCompany">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="cccompany_cert" TYPE="CCCompany" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="WrittenSignature">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="cc_cert" TYPE="CreditCard" FROM="CCCompany"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="dl_cert" TYPE="DriversLicense" FROM="InState"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="milID_cert" TYPE="MilitaryID" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="OoSdl_cert" TYPE="DriversLicense" FROM="OutofState"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="OoSid_cert" TYPE="IDCard" FROM="OutofState"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="passport_cert" TYPE="Passport" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="sscard_cert" TYPE="SSCard" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="ProofDateOfBirth">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="dl_cert2" TYPE="DriversLicense" FROM="InState"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="id_cert2" TYPE="IDCard" FROM="InState"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="milID_cert2" TYPE="MilitaryID" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="passport_cert2" TYPE="Passport" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="birth_cert" TYPE="BirthCertificate" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="adoption_cert" TYPE="AdoptionCertificate" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="SocialSecurityNumber">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="milID_cert3" TYPE="MilitaryID" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="sscard_cert2" TYPE="SSCard" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="ResidencyPersonalData">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="voterreg_cert" TYPE="VoterRegCard" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="dl_cert3" TYPE="DriversLicense" FROM="InState"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="id_cert3" TYPE="IDCard" FROM="InState"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="empid" TYPE="EmployeeID" FROM="IBM"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="ValidCreditCardHolder">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="cc_cert2" TYPE="CreditCard" FROM="CCCompany"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="SpecialPermits">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="spt2" TYPE="WeaponPermit" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="LocalDMV">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="a_local_dmv" TYPE="StateDMV" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="TrustedFlightSchool">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="flight_s" TYPE="TrustedFlightSchool" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="CurrentVehicleTitle">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="cvtx" TYPE="VehicleTitle" FROM="LocalDMV"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="pilotl1" TYPE="PilotLicense" FROM="TrustedFlightSchool"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="IBM">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="bus_id_1" TYPE="RegisteredBusiness" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="EmploymentStatus">
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<RULE><INCLUSION ID="empid1" TYPE="Disabled" FROM="USCountry"/></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="empid2" TYPE="EmployeeID" FROM="IBM"/></RULE>
</GROUP>
</POLICY>

B.2

DMV negotiation client policy

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE POLICY SYSTEM "Policy.dtd">
<!-- DRIVERS LICENSE Scenario: Andy’s Policy (Client) -->
<POLICY>
<GROUP NAME="self" />
<GROUP NAME="USCountry">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION ID="us_cert" TYPE="Country" FROM="self">
<FUNCTION>
<EQ><FIELD ID="us_cert" NAME="CountryCode" /><CONST>US</CONST></EQ>
</FUNCTION>
</INCLUSION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="ForeignCountry">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION ID="foreign_cert" TYPE="Country" FROM="self">
<FUNCTION>
<NE><FIELD ID="foreign_cert" NAME="CountryCode" /><CONST>US</CONST></NE>
</FUNCTION>
</INCLUSION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="State">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="instate_cert" TYPE="State" FROM="USCountry" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="PrivacySealProgram">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="prog_cert" TYPE="Program" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="PrivacySealCertified">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="privacy_cert" TYPE="Certification" FROM="PrivacySealProgram" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="USGovtCertified">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="usgovt_cert" TYPE="Certification" FROM="USCountry" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="StateGovtCertified">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="stategovt_cert" TYPE="Certification" FROM="State" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="ForeignGovtCertified">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="foreigngovt_cert" TYPE="Certification" FROM="ForeignCountry" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="BBB">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="bbb111" TYPE="CertificationAuthority" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<!-- This group cannot be satisfied on the Server :) -->
<GROUP NAME="Corporation">
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<RULE><INCLUSION ID="corporation1" TYPE="Incorporated" FROM="BBB" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
</POLICY>

B.3

Medical records negotiation server policy

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE POLICY SYSTEM "Policy.dtd">
<!-- MEDICAL RECORDS Scenario: State Farm Policy (Server) -->
<POLICY>
<GROUP NAME="self" />
<GROUP NAME="State">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="Board_cert0" TYPE="State" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="StateMedicalBoard">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="Board_cert1" TYPE="StateMedicalBoard" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="CertificationBoard">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="Board_cert2" TYPE="CertificationBoard" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="Doctor">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="Doctor_cert1" TYPE="MedicalPractitioner" FROM="StateMedicalBoard" /></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="Doctor_cert2" TYPE="MedicalPractitioner" FROM="CertificationBoard" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="CCCompany">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="ccc" TYPE="TrustedCreditCardCompany" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="CreditCard">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="cc" TYPE="MasterCard" FROM="CCCompany" /></RULE>
<!-- OR -->
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="cc2" TYPE="Discover" FROM="CCCompany" /></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="cc3" TYPE="AmericanExpress" FROM="CCCompany" /></RULE>
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="cc4" TYPE="VISA" FROM="CCCompany" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="USGov">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="usgov" TYPE="TrustedGovernment" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="LocalDMV">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="ldmv" TYPE="GovernmentBranch" FROM="USGov" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="PersonalInfo">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="dl" TYPE="DriverLicense" FROM="LocalDMV" /></RULE>
<!-- OR -->
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="pass" TYPE="Passport" FROM="USGov" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="SocialSecurityAdministration">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="ssa" TYPE="GovernmentBranch" FROM="USGov" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="SocialSecurityNumber">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="ssn1" TYPE="SSCard" FROM="SocialSecurityAdministration" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
</POLICY>
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Figure B.2: The semi-relevant medical records negotiation (A) extends the baseline
negotiation by adding a CreditCard policy group. The none-relevant negotiation (B)
adds the policy groups PersonalInfo and SocialSecurityNumber. The semi-relevant
negotiation illustrates how the server is able to retrieve the client’s credit card during
the negotiation (because the server also possesses a BBB credential). The client is
unaware that medical records are not the subject of the server’s policy in the nonerelevant negotiation. Because the server can partially satisfy the client’s policies
with a BBB credential (the server does not have a credential that can satisfy the
GovernmentInstitution policy group), the DriverLicense and VISA card are released.
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B.4

Medical records negotiation client policy

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE POLICY SYSTEM "Policy.dtd">
<!-- MEDICAL RECORDS Scenario: Bob’s Policy (Client) -->
<POLICY>
<GROUP NAME="self" />
<GROUP NAME="State">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="State_cert1" TYPE="State" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="Provider">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="Provider_cert1" TYPE="Provider" FROM="State" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="ValidBizLicensers">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="vbl1" TYPE="TrustedBizCertifier" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>

<GROUP NAME="CommercialBusiness">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="combus" TYPE="BBB" FROM="ValidBizLicensers" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="GovernmentSelfSigned">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="gov_self_signed" TYPE="US" FROM="self" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="GovernmentInstitution">
<RULE><INCLUSION ID="gov_ent" TYPE="USGovernment" FROM="GovernmentSelfSigned" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
</POLICY>

B.5

Bookstore negotiation server TPL policy

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE POLICY SYSTEM "Policy.dtd">
<!-- BOOKSTORE Scenario: Store Policy (Server) -->
<POLICY>
<GROUP NAME="self" />
<GROUP NAME="AccreditingBody">
<RULE><INCLUSION FROM="self" ID="accreditingbodycert" TYPE="AccreditingBody" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="University">
<RULE><INCLUSION FROM="AccreditingBody" ID="universitycert" TYPE="University" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="Student">
<RULE><INCLUSION FROM="University" ID="studentcert" TYPE="Student" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
</POLICY>

B.6

Bookstore negotiation client TPL policy

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE POLICY SYSTEM "Policy.dtd">
<!-- BOOKSTORE Scenario: Student Policy (Client) -->
<POLICY>
<GROUP NAME="self"></GROUP>
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Figure B.3: The bookstore semi-relevant negotiation differs from the previous two
because the client sends the malicious policy. The malicious policy in the semirelevant negotiation includes the policy group CreditCard and is further extended
in the none-relevant negotiation with the group PasswordDB. In both negotiations,
the server does not have the credentials necessary to satisfy either the CreditCard
or the PasswordDB policy groups (wishful thinking on behalf of the client). Both
negotiations terminate with failure.
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<GROUP NAME="PasswordDB">
<RULE><INCLUSION FROM="self" ID="password_database" TYPE="DBFile" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="CCCompany">
<RULE><INCLUSION FROM="self" ID="credit_company" TYPE="CCCompany" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="CreditCards">
<RULE><INCLUSION FROM="CCCompany" ID="credit" TYPE="CreditCard" /></RULE>
</GROUP>
</POLICY>
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